CHAPTER VIII.

THE WAR OF THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION. (1) THE PRAGMATIC SANCTION.

THE great struggle for the Spanish Succession was barely over before another succession problem began to occupy the Foreign Ministries of Europe. Like their Spanish cousins, the Austrian Habsburgs found themselves threatened with a failure of male heirs ; and, to meet this possibility, Leopold I in 1703 had made definite regulations (pactum mutuae successionis) by which, in default of male heirs, females should succeed, with the special proviso that the daughters of Archduke Joseph were to take precedence of those of his brother Charles. But, after 1711 Joseph's sudden death had placed Charles on the Imperial throne, this arrangement was altered in April, 1713 ; and by a secret family law, known hereafter as the " Pragmatic Sanction," Charles gave his own daughters priority over his brother's, and at the same time insisted strongly on the indivisibility of the Habsburg dominions-a principle now first adopted. In making this change the Emperor was well within his rights, and circumstances had changed since 1703, when the renewed establishment of separate branches of the family at Vienna and at Madrid had seemed probable. Moreover, Joseph's daughters could hardly claim former Spanish provinces like Milan and the Netherlands over which their father had never ruled.

This was an important step gained ; but to secure the recognition of the European Powers was far more necessary, and by this object the foreign policy of Charles VI was henceforward dominated.

Curiously enough, the first guarantor of the Pragmatic Sanction was Philip V, Charles1 successful rival in Spain. On hostile terms with England and Holland, separated from France by dynastic pretensions, Spain found in the Ostend Company a bond with the Emperor, whose efforts to shake off the restrictions imposed on the commerce of the Netherlands and to obtain a share in the lucrative East Indian trade had embroiled him with the Maritime Powers. Among the stipulations of the League of Vienna (May, 1725) was Spain's recognition of the Pragmatic Sanction ; and the adhesions which the League subsequently received increased the number of guarantors. Russia (August, 1726) was the next; and, before the end of 1726 Prussia (October), Mainz and the four Wittelsbach Electors, Charles Albert of Bavaria, his brother Clement Augustus of Cologne, and their cousins Charles Philip of the Palatinate and Francis Lewis of Trier, had joined the League. However, though Bavaria's support was thus obtained, the somewhat unnatural Austro-Spanish alliance soon collapsed without having effected anything. Charles Albert, regarding himself as thereby absolved from his pledge, with the assistance of the Elector Palatine Charles Philip and the Elector of Saxony, vigorously opposed the Emperor's efforts to obtain the guarantee of the Diet. This, however, was obtained in January, 1732, Frederick William of Prussia lending the Emperor his support, while in the same year Denmark became a guarantor, Cologne having renewed its guarantee in 1731 Long before this, however, Elisabeth Farnese, distrusting the Emperor's sincerity and seeing no prospect of the proposed marriages between her sons and Charles' daughters ever taking place, had come to terms with the Maritime Powers and France, concluding in November, 1729, the Treaty of Seville, by which, in return for a guarantee of Parma and Tuscany to Don Carlos, she withdrew the concessions promised to the Ostend Company. To this the Emperor would not agree ; and in 1730 war again seemed imminent, when Walpole, by promising to guarantee the Pragmatic Sanction, induced Charles VI to give way. The Second Treaty of Vienna (March 16, 1731) sacrificed the trade of the Netherlands to the needs of the Habsburg dynasty and to the jealousy between England and Holland, though France refused to follow her allies in guaranteeing the Pragmatic Sanction, declaring that to do so would be as bad as the loss of three battles.

(2) PRUSSIA UNDER FREDERICK WILLIAM I.

Frederick William I ascended the throne of Prussia on February 25, 1713, at the age of twenty-four. His father and mother had maintained a Court of great magnificence ; but Frederick William had inherited Queen Sophia Charlotte's good sense without her love of refinement and of tasteful splendour. Immediately on his accession he cut down the expenditure of the Court so that it scarcely exceeded the establishment of a wealthy private gentleman. This decision on the part of the new sovereign almost completely ruined the arts and crafts of the capital, and several artists of real eminence were compelled to seek a livelihood in other countries. These rigid economies, which were carried into all the departments of State, increased the yearly revenues of the Crown so considerably, that it was practicable to raise the infantry from 38 to 50 battalions, and the cavalry from 53 to 60 squadrons.

Frederick William had himself learnt obedience when as Crown Prince he had served under Eugene and Marlborough at Malplaquet. The King looked up with admiration to his best general, Prince Leopold of Anhalt, who was then thirty-seven years of age, and hoped with the accession of his youthful friend to be called upon to take the lead in political and military affairs. But, when he attempted to put himself forward, he was very distinctly sent about his business. "Tell the Prince of Anhalt "-so runs one of the first letters written by Frederick William as King-"that I am the Finance Minister and the Field-Marshal of the King of Prussia; this will keep the King of Prussia on his legs."

The discontent generally prevailing, and particularly among business people and officials, and even in the army, notwithstanding its enormous privileges, would, in Clement's opinion, make it an easy matter to stir up a rebellion against Frederick William I. At Court it was considered that the King's most distinguished general, the Prince of Anhalt, would with the help of officers devoted to him be capable of dethroning the King, if Germany were convulsed by a breach on the part of Prussia with the Emperor and England-capable of the deeds of a Marius and a Sulla, as Frederick the Great in his History writes of the victor of Turin, the founder of the Prussian infantry.

The antagonism between Great Britain and Russia was constantly growing. In 1719 a. British squadron sailed to the Baltic. At the same time Stanhope, the English Prime Minister, went to Berlin to turn Frederick William from his alliance with Peter and draw him over to the side of England. But, though Frederick William acquiesced in Stanhope's remark that the English had a fine fleet and he a fine army, and that these two forces ought to cooperate, he very judiciously decided not to take part in an English attack on Livonia. All the Powers were soliciting the friendship of Prussia ; and in 1720, when the danger of a general outbreak of war was past, the Berlin Cabinet by the intervention of England and with the connivance of Russia obtained the definite cession of Stettin by Sweden.

" You must yourself alone superintend the revenue and keep the supreme command of the army firmly in your own hands....Officers and officials must know that you hold the purse-strings." For the first six weeks of his reign the King's successor must, following his own example, devote himself entirely to the study of the budget; he should then reduce all official salaries by about 25 per cent., but on no account reduce the income of the army. In a year's time he may begin to raise again the salaries of those who are doing their duty. But, he adds, " you must work as I have always done ; a ruler who wishes to rule honourably must attend to all his affairs himself, for rulers are ordained for work and not for idle, effeminate lives such as, alas, are led by most great people."

The King deals next with economic conditions, which, like all his contemporaries, he judges from the point of view of mercantilist theories. " If the country is thickly populated, that is true wealth." Small towns must be founded where they are wanting. Industries, more especially the manufacture of cloth and woollen goods, are to be encouraged everywhere by the Government. "Then you will see how your revenues increase and your land prospers ! " The French refugees settled there had first taught the Prussians to become manufacturers in important branches of industry. " A country without industries is a human body without life, a dead country, which is always poor and wretched and never prospers....Therefore I beg you, my dear successor, maintain the industries, protect them and tend their growth, establishing them wherever possible throughout the country." Warnings followed against listening to flatterers, and ignoring the corruption still prevalent among Prussian officials, and the successor is exhorted to pay all salaries promptly, to contract no government loans, but every year to pay 500,000 thalers (£15,000) into the treasury. Every year he is to travel through all the provinces to see for himself that everything is in perfect order. In religious matters, the chief thing is to build churches and schools. The Reformed Church and the Lutherans must not be allowed to quarrel, and only a limited freedom is to be granted to the clergy, because everyone of them would like to be Pope. The Catholics are to be tolerated, but not the Jesuits, nor foreign Jews wishing to immigrate.

This memorable testament proves how unjust was the opinion formerly prevalent in Europe and among historians that Frederick William I was nothing more than a barbarian with the ideas and gifts of a sergeant. This conception has doubtless some truth in it, but there is equally good reason for the verdict of Theodor von Schön, himself an eminent reformer in the days of Stein and Hardenberg, who described Frederick William I as " Prussia's greatest King in respect of domestic policy."

The political situation changed completely soon after the acquisition of Stettin by Prussia. Though Russia and Great Britain were still enemies, the latter Power and Austria were no longer allies but bitter opponents, on account of the Ostend Company. A joint attack on Hanover by the Austrians and Russians was threatening. Once again, as had been the case a few years before, the King of Prussia held a geographically central position between the Great Powers whose encounter seemed imminent. After considerable hesitation the Prussian sovereign decided to support Austria; and at the close of 1728 a defensive alliance was concluded between the two Powers at Berlin.

Besides France, Prussia was at this time the only civilised country in which an absolute form of government had been completely established. But it was a convincing proof of Frederick William's great force of character that between 1713 and 1740 the material resources of Prussia were placed at the service of the Government in a far fuller measure than had ever been secured by the French Crown. To the Cabinets of Europe it was a mystery how the sovereign of a poor barren State like Prussia was able in 1729 to maintain a standing army of nearly 70,000 men. Added to this, there was a well-filled treasury. Two hundred years ago a State so organised was a Great Power, even though its population hardly exceeded two millions.

King Frederick William was, not without reason, proud that his internal reforms had given him sufficient strength to be able to prohibit foreign nations from fighting their battles on North German soil. " It is no mere boast,11 he said, " that I have won honour for the House of Brandenburg. All my life long I have never sought alliances, nor made advances to a foreign Power. My maxim is to injure no one, but not to let myself be slighted." Yet, at the same time, his self-consciousness as to his achievements in the sphere of foreign policy was not justified to its full extent. His strength lay entirely in his home policy; in his foreign relations he felt insecure-and rightly so, for he lacked both sufficient mental training and the inborn gift of perception which would have made it possible for him to understand the great affairs of the world.

In 1730 Sir Charles Hotham arrived at the Prussian Court as British envoy extraordinary to conclude the negotiations which had been pending five years for the marriage of Prince Frederick, who had in the meantime become Prince of Wales, with Princess Wilhelmina, eldest daughter of the King. But his instructions went still further. He was to propose a further marriage, between the eighteen year old Prussian Crown Prince and an English princess. Queen Sophia Dorothea, herself an English princess, and her children, were strongly in favour of Hotham's proposals. But a powerful party at the Court opposed this fresh connexion between the Houses of Brandenburg and Hanover. At the head of this party was General von Grumbkow, the King's chief support in his military administration, and financial and commercial policy. Grumbkow belonged to the " Tobacco College," as it was called, a party of gentlemen in favour with the King who met regularly in the evening to smoke and drink beer-practices considered very vulgar by contemporary European society. Other frequenters of the "Tobacco College" were Prince Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau and the Emperor's ambassador, Field-Marshal Count Seckendorf, a Protestant, who played a curious double rôle at Berlin as friend of the King and representative of the Emperor, but took advantage of his position with an unscrupulous-ness beyond ordinary diplomatic subtlety. Among these associates Frederick William allowed himself the utmost unconstraint ; unsuspicious and docile as he was, he thus afforded his generals and officials frequent opportunities for influencing him and gaining him over to their selfish ends. But the Court at large was likewise full of intrigues.

Prussian State, the King on one occasion went so far as to say, after administering a few of his usual cuffs, that, had he been treated so by his father, he would have shot himself, but that Frederick had no sense of honour, and would put up with anything.

The unhappy Prince now formed a rash resolve to escape from his tormentor, taking flight by way of France to England. He applied for aid to Sir Charles Hotham and his attaché Guy Dickens ; but they refused it and discouraged the whole plan. Nevertheless, when on a journey with his father to the south-west of Germany, Frederick made every preparation for escaping across the Rhine into France. But at the last moment, at Mannheim, one of the pages of the Crown Prince, who was involved in the plan of escape, threw himself at the King's feet and disclosed everything. Frederick's chief accomplice had been Lieutenant Hans Hermann von Katte, a young man of good family, rather older than the Prince. Most of the aristocracy detested the institutions of absolutism ; " Court and army teem with unrest," wrote Grumbkow. The young officer, though barely of age, was pronounced guilty of high treason, and, after having been for weeks threatened with torture, was finally beheaded at Cüstrin ; the Crown Prince, who was kept a close prisoner in the fortress, being obliged to witness the execution from the window of his prison (November 6). Frederick William's pitiless action was universally condemned abroad, particularly in England ; but Frederick William defiantly bade his ambassador in London state that if a hundred thousand Kattes made their appearance he would have every one of them beheaded. " He would have the English know that he would suffer no rule beside his own." Frederick William for a time had serious thoughts of compelling the prisoner at Cüstrin to renounce his birthright, and of transferring the succession to the Crown to his second son ; but, as a matter of course, he soon had to relinquish any intentions of the kind. It was, however, very slowly and with the utmost reluctance that he submitted to the necessity of resuming normal family relations with the Crown Prince. For the next few years the relations between father and son were rather less stormy ; but the Crown Prince still had so much cause to tremble before the passion of Frederick William that he often desired his father's death.

France was at this time reckoned to be maintaining land forces to the extent of 160,000 regular troops ; the Russian army was estimated at 130,000 men, the Austrian at from 80,000 to 100,000. Frederick William, with little over two million subjects, raised the Prussian army to a total of 80,000. At his accession, in 1713, before the close of the War of the Spanish Succession, the Prussian army was only 38,000 strong, about equal to the forces of the Kings of Sardinia and of Saxony and Poland respectively, and, like the troops of these sovereigns, could only be maintained by means of subsidies from the Western Powers. Since such payments were only made in time of war, the Prussian army, under both the Great Elector and Frederick I, was invariably almost entirely disbanded on the conclusion of peace. Frederick William I, at that time the only real autocrat in the civilised world besides the King of France, followed the example of France in creating a large standing army which could be maintained from his State's own resources in time of peace and during a certain number of campaigns. In proportion to the population and wealth of the two countries, the Prussian army was immeasurably stronger than the French. Consequently, it was no easy task for the King of Prussia to supply the human material for his new military creation. He cherished the prejudice that only tall men were fit to be soldiers. Besides, in his army the troops were treated much as his own son had been. Whereas in France the punishment of flogging was never inflicted on soldiers and in England its application was surrounded by protective provisions, in the Prussian army flogging was as freely used as in the Russian. According to the King's notions the stick was an indispensable implement of military education. After his visit to King George I at Hanover in 1725, he wrote to Leopold of Dessau in high commendation of the impressive appearance and the many fine qualities of the Hanoverian troops, but added: "What in my opinion is wanting is subordination; they do their duty because they delight in it, not from a sense of subordination, for scarcely a blow can be dealt any man among them under pain of the King's displeasure. Every private soldier knows this, and yet the army is in good order ; which greatly surprises me."

Frederick William I's views as to the treatment of the recruits won by earnest-money, or by force and cunning, were quite reasonable in theory. He demanded of his officers that a young soldier should be taught everything without railing and abuse, so that a man might not turn sullen and timid at the very outset. Neither was a recruit to be beaten or otherwise ill-treated, particularly if he was of a nationality other than German. But these wise provisions of the regulations remained a dead letter in the practice of the service. Frederick William cared rather more effectively for the comfort of the soldiers than for their humane treatment ; but a good deal of what was intended for the troops was embezzled by the officers, many of whom were still very corrupt.

In 1809 Napoleon wrote to Alexander of Russia that, when they should have jointly forced England to make peace, they might do Europe the service of abolishing the system of enormous standing armies begun by Prussia. This statement of the French Emperor's is a little biassed, as Louis XIV's was the first standing army of any dimensions raised since the days of classical antiquity. But it is, nevertheless, true that, in proportion to the population and wealth of Prussia, the army of Frederick William I was of enormous size. The military Powers of to-day oblige at most 1| per cent, of the population to serve in the army. Frederick William's standing army amounted to nearly 4 per cent, during the three months of the year in which the soldiers on leave (whose numbers at other times were no doubt very large) were called in.

The royal Commander-in-chief of this exorbitantly large army was not completely dominated by the dynastic point of view which still prevailed in the European Courts. He called himself a Republican, thereby implying his belief in the idea of the State as the true rule of conduct for all sovereigns. Putting the genuineness of his religious feelings to a practical test, Frederick William worked for the good of his subjects in a way which indirectly became a pattern for a whole generation of princes. His father's schooling, which was so repugnant to him, taught the Crown Prince the virtue of application so especially prized by the royal taskmaster. The father wished to pass for a Republican, and the son designated himself "the chief servant of the State." Following the example of Frederick the Great, numerous German Princes applied themselves diligently to the political woi'k which their predecessors had neglected. Thus the condition of Germany benefited largely through the change in the spirit of the government introduced by Frederick William I.

Where the aristocracy resisted this compulsory service, Frederick William resorted without hesitation to dragonnades and kidnapping of children. A certain Herr von Kleist of Zeblin in Eastern Pomerania would not let his son enter the regiment of his district ; and a widow, Frau von Below, refused to direct her son, who was away in Poland, to do the same. The King thereupon ordered the commander of the regiment to quarter a corporal and twelve men on the property of these two persons until they sent in their sons. In East Prussia boys of good family were carried off by the soldiery from their fathers1 houses and sent under escort in bands of 18 or 20 to Berlin, where they were placed in the military school. Peter the Great had in like manner compelled the Russian provincial gentry to serve as officers. The Kings of France did not dare to go to such lengths.

In Prussia the officers of the army were the ruling caste, like the priests in other countries. The King insisted on the fact that he stood on a far more intimate personal footing with the officers than with the rest of his subjects. Following his example, the officers treated the official classes, the learned professions, and the upper middle classes generally, with a contempt and at times a brutality which rendered the position of these classes uncomfortable and insecure. Prussia was a polity of officers. Their numbers were enormous, their service monotonous and very rarely interrupted by periods of leave. The nobility might console themselves for the loss of their freedom by the fact that, in the main, they made up the whole of this officers' polity.

It was no doubt the fiscal point of view which predominated when this civilising movement was set on foot. The immediate object was to open up the resources of East Prussia so that the land might be able to contribute more towards the army. A report from the Board of Domains of East Prussia to the King states that the establishment of the Swiss in that province had occasioned no great outlay ; for the horses, oxen and cows supplied to them as an advance in the King's name had been charged to them at five to six thalers, whereas they had cost on an average about three thalers. Hence it, came about that many of the settlers who had been attracted by the King's promises bitterly repented their coming, the more so as the effects of this fiscal policy were further aggravated by corruption in official circles. Frederick William would on no account permit dissatisfied colonists to emigrate again ; in fact, he punished attempts on the part of settlers to get away from their new homes almost as severely as military desertion. But, despite all distressing accompaniments, the resettlement of East Prussia remains a most praiseworthy proceeding. The province, which lay on the borders of European civilisation, was raised to a higher plane by the colonists, who were mentally and morally superior to the original inhabitants. The King, who never succeeded in raising the revenue to more than seven million thalers a year, is proved to have expended at least three millions, possibly much more, on the resettlement of East Prussia. It was a very difficult matter to transplant thirty thousand country people with south and west German customs to a distant province of widely different character and devastated by pestilence, and to settle them so that they gradually became acclimatised and raised the native population to their own level. The whole movement was personally organised by Frederick William, who visited East Prussia on six different occasions for this purpose ; in accordance with his general practice of constantly travelling through his State.

The King managed the Crown lands as a farming enthusiast manages his estate. The farmers-general, to whom he let the several domains for six years each, administered police and justice on feudal principles over the "subjects" of the domain. The fees accruing to them from these prerogatives were taken into account when fixing the rental. So the masters had a very keen moral sense when it came to punishing all misdemeanours of the country people; and the fines imposed on the peasants were far from light, whether for disobedience and remissness in bearing the feudal burdens or for disorderly conduct and bad language.

By a drastically maintained policy of this kind the King during his reign of twenty-seven years raised the income from the domains from 1,500,000 to 3,300,000 thalers. A host of civil suits decided by arbitrary administration of justice in a manner advantageous to the Treasury had contributed to this very large increase.

At the end of the reign of Frederick William I the Crown lands yielded, as stated, 3,300,000 thalers; the taxes 3,600,000. This taxation, in Prussia as on the Continent generally, was borne by the burgher and peasant classes, the nobility being for the most part exempt. In East Prussia alone was this privilege denied the nobles ; but they resorted to fraud and bribery. They paid no higher tax for their richest acre of land than for their poorest, and kept no cattle in order to shift the burden of the cattle-tax upon the shoulders of the peasantry, which, being held in bondage, must work for the feudal lords. Any deficiency in the domestic economy of the landlords was made good by demanding an excessive amount of forced labour from the peasants. Much land belonging to the nobles was not taxed at all. The King completely overthrew this system. The newly introduced General Hide Tax (Generalhufenschoss) imposed on a large number of the East Prussian noblemen six times more taxes than they had hitherto paid; fully 34,681 hides of land belonging to the nobility, the existence of which had been kept secret by the owners, were entered on the tax roll. The increase in revenue was considerable enough to allow of the formation of three or four battalions. But, at the same time, owners of moderate and small properties were sensibly relieved. This was most essential, if the process of absorption of peasant proprietors by the big landowners was to be stopped. While in Western Pomerania, under Swedish rule, and in Mecklenburg the class of peasant proprietors-living, it is true, as bondmen, but on their own homesteads-almost entirely disappeared, a class of landless labourers taking their place, Frederick William I, and still more his son Frederick II, successfully laboured to preserve the peasant proprietor in their dominions. In East Prussia not only the reform of taxation but the settlement of 32,000 foreign country-folk decidedly contributed to securing for the province a tolerably fair apportionment of the rural landed property.

Measured by the standard of the French peasant class of that day, the social and economic level of the rustic population of Prussia remained, notwithstanding, very low. The peasants on the Crown lands, who were better off than those on the estates of the nobility, were often subjected to forced labour for the Contractor-General for four or more days a week. Then, besides other feudal burdens, there was the specially heavy obligation on all peasants to provide teams at the marches and reviews of the troops, and to supply straw for the camp. To mitigate these impositions, Frederick William instituted in particular districts " March and Burden (Molestien) Funds" which were to be supplied by the Estates, not by the Crown ; but these afforded nothing like complete relief. Characteristic of the position of the smaller rural landowners is the principle laid down by the royal Domains Commission in Lithuania, that a peasant on the Crown lands having an annual net income of 55 thalers cash should keep 20 and hand over the rest to the King. The subjects of the nobility were, as has been seen, in a considerably worse plight. It is therefore no wonder that the substitution of agricultural labourers for peasant proprietors progressed, although, as has been seen, in a large portion of the kingdom effective restrictions were put on this movement which were harmful to the community and unwelcome to the Crown. The French peasants were in almost every respect better off than the Prussian ; for most of them there was nothing beyond remnants of feudalism left to bear, and they were constantly acquiring more land.

The urban excise, established by the Great Elector as the financial corner-stone of monarchical authority, had not been introduced in any part of the monarchy except the Mark Brandenburg, Pomerania, and Magdeburg, when Frederick William came to the throne. He extended it to East Prussia and the wealthy districts round Halberstadt and Bielefeld. In the country round Hamm and Crefeld there was a special form of excise, which treated least effectively those dutiable articles which happened to be the most valuable. The King exchanged this relatively unproductive system for that in force in Brandenburg. He likewise procured fresh receipts by extending the monopoly on salt, introduced by the Great Elector, to almost the entire State. His system of taxation was most successful, as he increased the proceeds of taxation from 2,500,000 thalers to 3,600,000.

Furthermore, the King completely transformed the organisation of the government authorities. When he came to the throne, there were working side by side in Berlin a General Directory of Finance (General-flnanzdirectorium), which managed the receipts from the Crown lands, and a Chief War Commissariat (Qberlcriegskommissariat), into whose chest the taxes flowed. This historic dualism held good in the provinces likewise, where the Crown lands pertained to the boards of finance, and the taxes to the commissariat offices. Frederick William merged these two branches of the administration in one, in order to put an end to the constant friction between them. In Berlin the General Directory (Generaldirectorium) was established as a central administrative department ; in the provinces Chambers of War and Domains (Kriegs- und Domänenkammern) were formed. This organisation, instituted in 1723, remained practically unchanged until the extinction of the old Kingdom of Prussia in 1807. It formed the nucleus of a bureaucracy which was the finest in the world after the French, and in the end outstripped its prototype. The General Directory was divided into four departments, to each of which belonged a Minister and four or five head officials of the Treasury (Finanzräthe).

The King ordained that the members of the General Directory, the Ministers and Councillors, were not to be expected to be distinguished by special departmental knowledge. Rather, these officials were all alike to be well informed as to the whole of the affairs of the public administration. But, in the case of the provincial administrative bodies, Frederick William I was inclined to allow greater scope for specialisation to the War and Domains Offices, and the several Councillors of War (Kriegsräthe) were each to devote himself to a particular branch of the administration.

At the outset of his reign Frederick William I encountered a corrupt, oligarchical municipal government, resembling that which the Municipal Reform Bill of 1835 amended in England. Frederick William cleansed the municipalities of much of their ancient corruption ; but at the same time he almost completely destroyed the self-government of the towns. The town councils lost the right of cooptation. They might, it is true, send in to the Government a list of nominations whenever there was a vacancy on the council ; but neither the War and Domains Offices nor the General Directory took much notice of such lists, and they created only such people burgomasters and councillors as were in the Government's judgment capable, honest, and submissive. The municipalities also might no longer collect their own taxes. If the municipal revenues were not sufficient for the maintenance of street pavements, fire brigades, fountains, roads, bridges, etc., in the condition prescribed by the regulations of the General Directory and of the War and Domains Office, the latter body voted a special grant for the purpose out of the urban excise.

At this point the supremacy of the Councillor of Taxes began. The municipal budget was under his control; not a groschen might be spent either in accordance with the regular budget or beyond it without his knowledge. Town councillors were mostly holders of state appointments who also served the commune; but, even if the War and Domains Office allowed a few councillors to be taken from the merchant class or some other independent calling, the municipal authorities counted for nothing at all as against the all-powerful Councillor of Taxes. He had a hand in everything. He closely superintended the management of the municipal property and urged on the city-fathers, who were, generally speaking, slow to move in economic matters, the draining of marshes and the building of mills, and the construction of brick-yards and sheep-runs on land belonging to the municipality.

As the income from an important government tax like the urban excise depended upon the general prosperity of the community in which it was raised, the Councillor of Taxes had a far wider sphere of influence. He controlled weights and measures, and superintended the watch kept over building materials and food-stuffs; the duties on bread, meat, and beer had to be adjusted in his presence; he had to see that good beer was brewed; that thatches and shingle roofs were replaced by tiles, and draw-wells by pumps.

The advancement of commerce and manufactures was one of the chief duties of this representative of the Crown and of Providence. He must endeavour to attract capitalists and manufacturers to the town. He was commanded to manage the guilds and to encourage industries. In the Prussia of Frederick William I these latter were subjected to government inspection, on the principle introduced by Colbert in France. The cloth-weavers were told how they were to clean, card, and dress the wool, and any shortcomings in any part of the technical process were notified by the inspectors for punishment to the revenue official, who had to see that there were proper fulling-mills, that the cloth-workers possessed good modern appliances, and that there were proper arrangements for dyeing. This state socialism even went so far as to impose upon the Councillor of Taxes the duty of finding employers and constant occupation for the home-workers among the weavers, and of settling the scale of wages in consultation with both parties.

Russian market. But in the meantime the cloth manufacture in Brandenburg had, over and above the money earned, made technical progress which was not lost, and there had been an enduring gain of commercial insight. The cloth-weaving industry of the Mark survived the loss of the Russian market and flourished anew.

Altogether the economic advance of the country was unmistakable, though slow-for statistics from which it is sought to deduce a great rise of prosperity in reality prove nothing. A mercantilist commercial policy pursued by a monarch with common sense and energy perhaps suited Germany even better than France, because the national decline of the seventeenth century had crippled the enterprise of the German middle class, formerly so alert. Not only was the progress of this policy carefully reo-ulated from above, but it also received pecuniary aid. The rigid economy adopted by Frederick William in the interests of the army did not deter him from making great outlays for productive purposes. It has already been stated that at least three million thalers were spent on the resettlement of East Prussia. More than two millions (£300,000) were divided among the several provinces for municipal improvements. If a town suffered heavy damages by fire, or by any other serious calamity, which if not allayed, must entail an appreciable abatement of the royal taxes, the King would with well-considered generosity open his purse. He left a specially fine memorial of himself in the Havelland, where he drained the marshy region of the Luch, employing military labour for the purpose. Thirty-five square miles were reclaimed for cultivation, after several large canals, numerous trenches, and more than thirty dikes of considerable size had been constructed.

In everything which this eminently practical monarch seriously undertook, he was favoured by fortune, so far as internal policy was concerned. His ecclesiastical policy also proved successful. He wielded a power over his clergy even more absolute than that in the hands of the King of-France. With the help of the University of Halle, he used this supremacy to win over the Protestant clergy of his kingdom to pietistic views. The Pietists were the only party in the Protestant Church of Germany at that time which was not torpid but full of life and productivity. Methodism, which was akin to it and which sprang up almost contemporaneously in England, was rejected by the Established Church of that country. The English Church accordingly fell into a state of apathy which lasted for a century, while in Prussia Protestantism continued active and spread its vivifying spirit among adherents of the same form of faith far beyond the boundaries of the Prussian monarchy.

Political equality was not enj oyed by religious minorities of that day in any European State ; and in the dominions of the House of Brandenburg the Catholics were not on an equality with the Protestants. But the King, if a keen Protestant, was a practical man ; he had Catholic officers and soldiers, and treated his Papist subjects in general so well that Rome, which at that period indeed could make no great claims, was satisfied with him. Of course, in a State so rigorously absolutist as that of Frederick William I there could be no question of liberty for the Church, whether Catholics, Lutherans, or members of the Reformed Church were in question. The King would have liked to effect a union of the two Protestant confessions. He considered it a step in that direction to forbid the Reformed ministers to preach on predestination, while the Lutheran clergy were prohibited from chanting in Latin, or introducing any music or the use of lighted candles on the altar, during the consecration of the elements in the Eucharist. They had also to give up surplices, stoles, eucharistie vestments, and the elevation of the Sacrament, and were no longer allowed to pronounce the benediction, crucifix in hand, at the close of the service. In these innovations the King encountered passive resistance, and he died in the midst of this difficulty before he had been able to come to a settlement with the clerical Opposition. Otherwise, the clergy as a class rendered absolute obedience to him. The submissiveness of the Prussian ministers in all political matters was further increased by the doctrines of Spener and Francke, both of whom considered that the mission of the clergy consisted almost exclusively in fostering the spiritual life and in charity.

Despite all the repellent traits in his character and in that of a polity of officers formed in his image, Frederick William remains a historical figure of the greatest importance. He, and he alone, created the means by which his son raised Prussia to the level of a Great Power. If Frederick William succeeded in laying the foundations for the development which was to follow, he owed his great and lasting achievements to his earnest piety, unsullied reputation, and eminently practical ability, and to a steadfast diligence which the pleasures of life were unable to turn aside from the strait path of duty. Last but not least, we must remember his scrupulous economy. The economy practised by him would have been superfluous in other countries ; but the King of Prussia, a small and poor State, felt that he must carry the exercise of this virtue so far, that when writing he used to put on over-sleeves to save the expensive cloth of his uniform. The King was so absolutely possessed by this idea as to feel that, if his object were to be attained, he must turn every thaler over three times before spending it.

(3) THE WAR.

But while Bavaria had claims, without the force to render them serious, another Power had a force so strong as to lend weight to claims which would not otherwise have been taken into account. Prussia's pretensions to the Silesian duchies of Brieg, Liegnitz, Jägerndorf and Wohlau were mainly important as a cloak under which to attempt to conceal the ambition and rapacity by which Frederick II was actuated. The falseness of his friendly professions had barely been suspected at Vienna, before it was published to the world by the invasion of Silesia by Prussian troops, 30,OQO of whom crossed the frontier on December 16, 1740. They found the province quite unprepared to meet this unexpected attack. The troops quartered in it were much below even its peace establishment of 13,000, and could only throw themselves into the fortresses of Brieg, Glatz, Glogau, and Neisse, letting the Prussians overrun and take possession of the rest of the province, while the capital, Breslau, hastened to come to terms with the invader.

Meanwhile, the Austrian force charged with the recovery of Silesia was collecting on the frontier ; but its mobilisation was greatly delayed by manifold defects in the military administration and by the lack of money which was mainly responsible for these shortcomings. Before Marshal Neipperg took the field (March 29), Frederick had been able to storm Glogau (March 9) and to reduce Ottmachau and other minor fortresses. But Frederick had not yet realised the importance of concentration : his troops, scattered to a dangerous degree, must have been caught and beaten in detail, but for Neipperg's blindness to his opportunities. Frederick himself at Jägerndorf had barely 4000 men with him ; and, though he was fortunate enough to be able to rally 10,000 more under Kalkstein at Steinau on April 6 and to pick up the blockaders of Brieg on the 9th, if Neipperg had used his numerous and excellent cavalry properly, the King might easily have been crushed before he could have effected these junctions. As it was, the Prussians had to relinquish their blockades of Brieg and Neisse ; and Neipperg was actually seven miles nearer Breslau than was Frederick on the morning of April 10, the day on which the armies met near the village of Mollwitz. Had the Prussian infantry's fighting capacities been of the same order as their monarch's strategy, Mollwitz would hardly claim to rank among decisive battles. Yet such it was ; for, although the Austrian cavalry, superior in numbers and in quality, promptly routed the Prussian horsemen and drove them and Frederick with them headlong from the field, when the victorious troopers turned on the Prussian infantry, repeated charges on the flank and rear failed to break the steady ranks. Meanwhile, the Austrian infantry had advanced but could make no head against the superior artillery opposed to them and the rapidity of fire which their iron ramrods allowed the Prussians to maintain, and before long Neipperg's whole army was retreating in disorder on Neisse.

Even before Mollwitz France was all but resolved on adopting the cause of Bavaria : Belleisle's influence was now predominant, and Fleury was only restrained from warmly advocating intervention by his natural irresolution and timidity and by jealousy of the supporters of the proposal. On March 10 Belleisle set out on his journey, in the course of which he was able to secure for Bavaria the support of the Spiritual Electors, though Mainz and Trier had hitherto shown themselves well disposed to Francis Stephen's candidature. At Dresden he was less successful, for Augustus III was jealous of his Bavarian brother-in-law, hated and distrusted Prussia, and was anxious to come to terms with Maria Theresa, could he induce her to make some concessions in Bohemia. Nor was Belleisle's first interview with Frederick, at Brieg about the end of April, any more satisfactory. Frederick was not anxious for French intervention and, while determined to keep Silesia, would have preferred to come to terms with Austria on that basis. But, although England (hoping to arrange a combination of Austria, Hanover, Saxony, and Prussia on the lines of the " Grand Alliance" of William Ill's day) sought to induce Maria Theresa to conquer her resentment and to secure Frederick's aid against Bavaria and France, not even Mollwitz could shake the Queen. Rather than make concessions to Frederick, she offered to the Bourbons substantial gains in the Netherlands, and even made overtures to Bavaria ; but her offers were rejected, and on the last day of July Charles Albert began hostilities by seizing Passau. He was able to do this, because on May 18 the Treaty of Nymphenburg had assured him the active assistance of France, while by Belleisle's mediation a compact had been made with Spain (May 28) for the partition of the Habsburg heritage. Moreover, Frederick, finding Maria Theresa deaf to the counsels of England and prudence, fell back on his alternative and concluded, on June 5, a treaty at Breslau. By this France guaranteed to him Breslau and Lower Silesia, in return for his promise to vote for Charles Albert and his renunciation of all claims on Julieh and Berg in favour of the Sulzbach line of the Wittelsbachs (the representatives of the other partner in the Jülich-Cleves partition of 1666), a pledge which helped to secure for the Bavarians the support of the Elector Palatine.

But Klein-Schnellendorf would have been too late to save Vienna, had Charles Albert been a strategist. When Neipperg left Neisse (October 16) the Bavarians, despite a quite unjustifiable delay of three weeks at Linz (September 14-October 5), were within a few marches of the ill-prepared Austrian capital. But from St Polten, which he reached oil October 21, the Elector suddenly turned back and, crossing the Danube at Mauthausen (October 24), directed his march into Bohemia. Military justification for this step he could not plead ; he could gain nothing in Bohemia that he might not have secured by taking Vienna-the only possible explanation is that he could not trust his allies and feared they would forestall him by seizing Bohemia for themselves. He had certainly good reason for distrusting Frederick, and Augustus III, who after much vacillation had finally been persuaded by Belleisle to join the coalition against Maria Theresa (September 19), certainly hoped for part of Bohemia ; but the move not only carried Charles Albert away from Vienna, the critical point where success might be assured, when the city was absolutely at his mercy-it also exposed Bavaria to a counter-stroke.

One of the measures adopted by Maria Theresa to provide for the defence of her capital had been to recall 10,000 men from her Italian possessions. These, it is true, were likely to be attacked before long by Spain and Naples ; but for the moment the troops could be spared, and their arrival at Vienna (December) provided a backbone of regulars for the wild irregulars whom the Hungarian " insurrection " was placing at Maria Theresa's disposal. Under the competent leadership of Count Khevenhiiller and his able subordinate Bärenklau, this force took the offensive with complete success (December 31). The 10,000 men whom Charles Albert had left to hold Upper Austria were surrounded in Linz and forced to capitulate (January 2e, 1742), after an attempt at relief by the Bavarian general Törring had been foiled at Scharding (January 17), and the Hungarian levies overran Bavaria in all directions. There was no little irony in the coincidence that on the day of the surrender of Linz the Diet at Frankfort elected Charles Albert to the vacant Imperial throne, and that, while the new Emperor was being solemnly crowned as Charles VII, Munich was capitulating to avoid being plundered (February 12). Törring had to retire on Ingolstadt, one of the very few places in Bavaria which had not passed into Khevenhiiller's hands before the end of February. But, once again, the course of events was changed by what was happening elsewhere.

Bohemia, instead of retiring on Silesia. The only effect of his attack on Moravia had been that Khevenhüller had had to detach some 10,000 men to Bohemia, which brought his own operations to a standstill. Thus reenforced, Charles of Lorraine proceeded to take the offensive against the French, hoping to bring de Broglie to action before he could be joined by further reenforcements from France. Partly to secure this junction, partly to ensure his own retreat if necessary, for his army was in a bad condition, de Broglie had just detached 10,000 men to secure Eger ; and between his left and the Prussians at Chrudim there was a gap into which the Austrians proposed to thrust themselves. But, when on May 12 the Austrian vanguard reached Czaslau, about two-thirds of the way from Znaim to Prague, it found the Prussians moving westward, evidently to hinder the Austrian manoeuvre, instead of retiring northward over the Elbe, as had been expected. On this, Prince Charles resolved to seek an action with the Prussians. Had he moved with greater speed, he might have caught Frederick at a disadvantage, for on the morning of May 16 there was a considerable space between the King, who was with his vanguard, and the main body, which was at Podhorzan. But an unnecessary halt of twelve hours at ßonnow and the miscarriage of a night-march, by which he sought to surprise the Prussian main body, deprived Charles of his chance ; while, though in the earlier stages of the action in which he engaged between Czaslau and Chotusitz on May 17 the Austrian commander gained some advantage, the balance was soon redressed by the return of Frederick and his division from Kuttenberg. When Frederick arrived, the Austrian cavalry, as at Mollwitz though with greater difficulty, had routed the Prussian horse and was chasing it off the field, while the opposing centres, composed in each case of infantry, were hotly engaged round Chotusitz. Seeing the left flank of the Austrian infantry exposed by the absence of their cavalry, he hurled his division on this critical point ; and his success decided the day. The Austrians withdrew in good order, though they had suffered 7000 casualties, about a quarter of their force. The Prussians, out of about equal numbers, lost 5000 all told ; their cavalry, though beaten, had done better than at Mollwitz ; but so had the Austrian infantry, and Frederick made no attempt to follow up his success. Indeed, he even remained inactive while the Austrians, after effecting a junction with the corps under Lobkowitz at Budweis, resumed the move against the French. Outnumbered by over two to one and in bad condition generally, the French were somewhat easily driven in on Prague, suffering several minor defeats and heavy losses. The garrisons left by them at Frauenberg, Pisek, and Pilsen surrendered at once; and by the end of June the remnants of the French invaders of Bohemia were cooped up in Prague, their communications with their friends in Bavaria having been severed by the fall of Pilsen.

Charles Emmanuel's action in throwing in his lot with Austria was dictated by no higher motive than self-interest. He carried on simultaneous negotiations with both parties and decided to support Austria, because he feared the Bourbons more and could get better terms from Maria Theresa, though the alliance of February 1,1742, left the question of concessions to be settled later, and was mainly concerned with military cooperation. Thanks to the help thus secured and to his own energy and resolution, Traun was able to ward off the Bourbon menace, actually taking (June 28) the capital of their ally the Duke of Modena and causing the Spanish-Neapolitan army to fall back in order to avoid an action. Moreover, in August the Neapolitans were recalled, an English squadron having appeared off Naples and threatened to bombard that city unless Charles III at once withdrew from the coalition. This was only one of the services rendered to the allied cause by the English fleet, now reinforced and under a zealous and active officer, Mathews, who forced the Franco-Spanish squadrons to withdraw into Toulon and cut off sea communications between Italy and Spain. In August a second Spanish army under Don Philip invaded Savoy, having been allowed a passage across France ; but it was repulsed from Piedmont (September), and, though the invasion called off Charles Emmanuel from the Papal States, which caused Traun also to retire into the Legations, an attempt of the Spaniards to follow him up ended disastrously for them at Campo Santo (February 8, 1743).

This success in Bavaria promised well for the recovery of Alsace and Lorraine; and Maria Theresa's prospects were further improved by the victory won by the Pragmatic Army at Dettingen on June 27. George II's delay on the Main had not merely thrown away a good chance of intercepting de Brogue's retreat, but it had given time for the collection of a fresh army under de Noailles, which crossed the Rhine near Worms (May 25) and proceeded to plant itself between the Pragmatic Army and Bavaria. Encouraged by George's hesitation, the French pushed closer to the Main ; and their cavalry, crossing to the northern bank of the river, so hampered the foraging operations of the Allies and curtailed their collection of supplies that the Pragmatic Army found it necessary to fall back from Aschaffenburg to its magazines and reinforcements at Hanau. It ought never to have got through, for de Noailles had it at a grave disadvantage, hemmed in between river and mountains, with enemies in flank, front and rear. But the rashness of a French subordinate officer and the splendid fighting capacity of the British and Hanoverian infantry gave George a victory which he neither deserved nor knew how to utilise. Instead of following up his success, he remained inactive at Hanau till August 10 ; and, when at last a joint attack on Alsace by the Pragmatic Army and the Austrians was arranged, the former force only crossed the Rhine at Mainz to relapse into inactivity at Worms (August 29-September 24). Charles of Lorraine was more enterprising ; but, being repulsed in an attempt to cross at Breisach (September 3) and finding his allies inactive, he took up winter-quarters betimes in Austrian Swabia.

Sardinia at Worms (September 13) by which Charles Emmanuel was nledged to assist in the expulsion of the Bourbons from Italy. The conclusion of this treaty, moreover, committed Maria Theresa to a policy of hostility to France, one result of which was to provoke in that country a reaction in favour of the war. France was heartily sick of the German campaign ; but the threat to Alsace and Lorraine, and the hope of making acquisitions in the Netherlands which would retrieve Belleisle's failure in Germany, seemed to have aroused even Louis himself. The recent death of Fleury (January 29, 1743) had removed that Minister's hesitation and indecision out of the path of the " forward party," while Amelot's place as Foreign Minister had been taken by de Tencin, who concurred with de Noailles and Richelieu in advocating active measures. Thus, within six weeks of the Treaty of Worms, the Bourbon counterblast was issued (October 25) in the shape of the Treaty of Fontainebleau, the so-called " Second Family Compact." This pledged France to help Spain in the recovery of Gibraltar and Minorca, to recognise Don Philip's rights on the Milanese, Parma, and Piacenza, and to declare formal war on England and on Austria (March 15 and April 26).

But before the formal declaration of war important collisions had taken place. Cardinal de Tencin's schemes included a vigorous offensive in Italy, as a prelude to which the blockade established by Mathews over Toulon must be raised, and an invasion of England on behalf of the exiled Stewarts, to which end de Roquefeuil's Brest fleet was to escort 15,000 troops across from Dunkirk. But when de Roquefeuil had crept cautiously up Channel to Dungeness (February 23), he found Norris and the Channel Fleet in his way, and only escaped an action against superior numbers by reason of a sudden and violent gale, which enabled him to regain Brest without a fight. The invasion project was accordingly abandoned, its only effect having been to detain in the Channel ships which would otherwise have reinforced Mathews. That admiral had meanwhile fought his notorious action with the Franco-Spanish fleet off Toulon (February 22, N.S.), in which, thanks mainly to obscure and imperfectly understood signals, the British attack miscarried altogether and resulted in a drawn battle not very unlike a defeat. But, despite this and the plentiful crop of Courts-martial to which it gave rise-Mathews himself being tried and cashiered on a technicality, while Lestock, his second-in-command and the principal culprit, escaped-the battle did not give the Franco-Spanish fleet the command of the Mediterranean, but only opened their communications with Italy for a couple of months, after which Mathews returned to the Gulf of Genoa and forbade passage between Spain and Italy.

Poland and Aurora von Königsmarck), had little difficulty in overrunning West Flanders, for Dutch neglect had left the " Barrier " fortresses in an almost indefensible condition and the Allies had no field array capable of interfering. They were at odds among themselves, and it was not till after a diversion elsewhere had called off 25,000 men from Flanders and reduced Saxe to the defensive that they at last took the field (July). Even then nothing was done ; the Dutch were very lukewarm and still pretended they were not at war with France ; Austria sent but few troops, leaving the defence of the Netherlands to the Maritime Powers ; and Wade, the British commander, an adherent of false principles of strategy, would not attack the strong defensive position taken up by Saxe on the Lys and failed to dislodge him by an aimless and feeble move against Lille. Thus the arrival of winter found Saxe still in possession of Menin, Courtrai, Ypres, and the other conquests made earlier in the year.

The diversion which had checked the conquest of Flanders was the Austrian invasion of Alsace. On June 30 Charles of Lorraine and Traun forced the passage of the Rhine at Germersheim, and Coigni had to retire by Haguenau on Strassburg, leaving the route into Lorraine open. But, before the Austrians, as usual somewhat deliberate and cautious, could follow up this advantage news arrived that on August 7 an ultimatum from Berlin had reached Vienna, and that the invaders of Alsace must return to defend Bohemia against yet another Prussian attack. On August 24 the Austrians recrossed the Rhine and, marching with an altogether unusual celerity, in a month stood at Waldmünchen on the borders of Bohemia.

Frederick's action was the natural outcome of the policy he had pursued since the Peace of Berlin. Never quite comfortable in Silesia, fearing that if successful elsewhere Maria Theresa would sooner or later turn her arms against Prussia, he had been negotiating and scheming all through 1743, encouraging Charles VII not to come to terms with Austria, trying to embitter the Tsarina against Maria Theresa and even seeking to rouse up the Turks. In May, 1744, his efforts had taken shape in the Union of Frankfort, by which Prussia, Hesse-Cassel, and the Elector Palatine bound themselves together to secure the restoration of Charles Albert to his hereditary dominions, the maintenance of the Emperor in his rights and of the Imperial Constitution, and the reestablishment of peace in Germany. It is impossible to attach much credit to Frederick's championship of the Imperial Constitution when it is noticed that this Union was promptly guaranteed by France, and that an additional compact with Charles Albert promised Frederick extensive gains in Bohemia. The net effect of it all was the ruin of the Austrian attempt to recover Alsace and Lorraine, lost respectively to the Empire in 1648 and 1738.

To her other great object, the recovery of Silesia, she was, however, no nearer. In January, 1745, an attempt to follow up the Prussian retreat proved a failure ; and, by the time (end of May) that the Austrians were ready to attempt something more serious than the raids and forays by their light troops which had kept the Prussians busy but secured no real advantage, the Prussians had had time to refit and to recover their moral. Conducted without much skill or vigour, the Austrian invasion of Silesia met with an abrupt and effective repulse at Hohenfriedberg (June 4), which Frederick followed up by invading Bohemia. But the Austrians rallied in a strong position at Königgrätz, which Frederick did not venture to attack (July), though he maintained his ground at Chlum on the Elbe for a couple of months, despite the vigorous attacks of the Austrian light troops on his communications. However, when their capture of Neustadt (September 16) cut him off from Glatz, he found himself so straitened for supplies that he had to fall back towards Silesia by the Schatzlar Pass. The Austrians pursued, profiting by his delay at Straudenz to get between him and the Pass, and followed up this success by attacking his camp at Sohr at daybreak (September 30). The Prussians were undoubtedly surprised, and, had not the Austrian attack been delivered with excessive regard to orderly procedure, things might have gone ill with Frederick. However, he rallied his men and, concentrating all available force against a hill which commanded his right, managed to snatch a victory that allowed him to withdraw unmolested to Silesia.

The course of affairs had taken an unfavourable turn for Austria in Italy. Here the adhesion of Genoa to the Bourbons had opened the

Habsburgs seemed about to be expelled from Italy, and d'Argenson's overtures to Charles Emmanuel were favourably received. But neither the peril of the Netherlands nor that of Italy could alter Maria Theresa's determination to make another effort to recover Silesia. Undeterred even by the withdrawal of Russia at the eleventh hour, she launched her armies again at Frederick in November, hoping by a move into Lusatia to push in between Silesia and Berlin. But a check at Gross-Hennersdorf (November 2e) was enough to defeat the move; and simultaneously a Prussian force under the elder Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau advanced up the Elbe against Dresden. To save the Saxon capital, Charles of Lorraine moved thither by Aussig and Pirna, while Frederick marched across Lusatia to succour his lieutenant. Had the Austrians moved a little faster, Leopold might have been crushed ; but, as usual, Charles of Lorraine was slow, and on December 15 the " Old Dessauer " gained a complete victory at Kesselsdorf over the Austro-Saxon army, which was endeavouring to cover Dresden. This victory was decisive. Dresden capitulated (December 18) ; Augustus III acceded to the Convention of Hanover (December 22); and Maria Theresa found herself with no alternative but to come to terms with Frederick, since England threatened to discontinue all subsidies if she remained obstinate, while France rejected all her overtures. On December 25, the Treaty of Dresden definitely ceded Silesia and Glatz to Frederick, who in return guaranteed the Pragmatic Sanction so far as it related to Germany, acknowledged Francis I as Emperor, and thus finally withdrew from the War of the Austrian Succession, alone among Maria Theresa's enemies gaining any substantial share of her dominions. For this success he had to thank, in the first place, the army which his father had raised and trained, the treasure which his father had collected, and the absolute power bequeathed to him by his ancestors. Secondly, gratitude was due from him to France, Bavaria and all the other enemies of Austria, whom he had joined and deserted with equal readiness as it suited his convenience. At the last moment, when he was nearly at the end of his resources and could ill have supported another campaign, he had derived important indirect assistance from the Scottish rising. But, above all, it was his own resourcefulness and resolution, his promptitude to perceive and profit by the necessities of friend and foe, his energy, determination, and daring, which had given him the coveted prize.

Maurice de Saxe was not the man to miss the opportunity given him by Cumberland's recall. No sooner had frost made the ground hard enough for troops to move, than he dashed at Brussels and, after a three weeks' siege (January 30-February 20,1746), forced it to surrender. Its fall was followed by that of Louvain and several other places, and the effect of the blow was seen when Holland hastened to send Wassenaer to Paris to negotiate a peace. The Dutch had never been enthusiastic for the war, and it would have been easy for France to close their ports to England by allowing Holland to become neutral, in which case, with Ostend lost, it would have been difficult for the English and Austrians to cooperate. But d'Argenson sought instead to arrange a general peace, for which England and Austria were not disposed. Cumberland's decisive victory at Culloden (April 16) and the Austrian successes in Italy improved the prospects and raised the demands of the Allies, and the whole negotiation broke down.

If France was not about to detach Holland from her allies by a separate peace, the obvious step to take was to make the United Provinces, as the point where the Allies would concentrate, the objective of the next campaign. Saxe urged this strongly; but political considerations-the wish not to provoke anti-French feeling among the Dutch or to imperil the negotiations-caused his scheme to be overruled in favour of the strategically less sound plan of a reduction of the eastern Netherlands. Saxe therefore, after forcing the Allies to retire from the Demer into Holland (May), detached Clermont to besiege Antwerp, himself covering the operation. Meanwhile, Conti's army, about 25,000 strong, was brought down from the Rhine and began operations by besieging Mons. It could be thus utilised with safety, because all the efforts of Maria Theresa and England to build up a coalition among the minor States of Germany had proved futile. Bavaria hired out 6000 troops to the Maritime Powers ; but the Elector Palatine and Wurtemberg were friendly to France, the Spiritual Electors merely cared to keep the war out of their borders, and the promise of the French envoy at Ratisbon that France would respect the neutrality of the Empire removed all chance of operations on the middle Rhine.

But if England and Holland were ready for peace, so were their adversaries. The death of Philip V (July 9, 1746) had diminished the influence of Elisabeth Farnese, whose aspirations were not shared by her pacifically-disposed step-son Ferdinand VI ; while the recovery of naval supremacy by England was making itself felt in France through the heavy sufferings of the French mercantile marine, which was almost swept from the seas, with disastrous results to the French finances.

Thus, when the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle met (March, 1748) only Maria Theresa, who had at last secured a promise of Russian assistance, was anxious to continue the War. Enraged at finding the Maritime Powers resolved on peace, she once again had recourse to separate negotiations with France; but, though Kaunitz really believed that this time success was his, France was negotiating with England and Holland at the same time and preferred to come to terms with them (April 30,1748). Several months of complicated negotiations followed ; but, finally, on October 18, a definite treaty was concluded between England, Holland, and France ; Spain adhering to it two days later ; and before the end of November Austria and Sardinia had given their reluctant assent. Unwilling as Charles Emmanuel was to resign Finale to Genoa and Piacenza to Don Philip, he was powerless without English subsidies ; and, while Maria Theresa could bring no pressure to bear on England she could do nothing in Italy without the Sardinian army and the English fleet.

The repeated faithlessness of Frederick II filled Maria Theresa with distrustful uneasiness lest a suitable opportunity might be similarly used, while desire for revenge was an additional incentive to putting her house in order with a view to a renewal of the struggle. But, while Austria had suffered in territory, it may be questioned whether this loss was not satisfactorily balanced by other gains. Hungary was no longer a cause for anxiety, but for the future was a source of strength ; the War had done much to weld together the Austrian dominions ; Maria Theresa's unfailing courage and determination had appealed to the best instincts of her subjects and awakened in them a fervid loyalty which none of her predecessors had ever aroused ; the Austrian army had been greatly improved; Bavaria and Saxony, no longer rivals, were now faithful allies ; and the drawing closer of the alliance with Russia had strengthened Maria Theresa's position. France, on the other hand, had assisted to place Don Philip on the throne of Parma and to secure Silesia for Frederick ; yet these were but poor returns for her efforts and sacrifices. Fontenoy and Lauffeldt had retrieved the disgrace of Dettingen and Bohemia-but to have been Frederick's catspaw was of little benefit to Louis XV. The attempt to partition the Habsburg dominions had failed, and France had even lost control of her old clients in southwestern Germany, such as Bavaria. Nor had she gained any success in the struggle with England; her enemy had not only retrieved a bad start, but had been able to wring from her the restoration of the provinces which her armies had overrun ; while the War had served to purge the British navy of the ill-effects of peace and neglect, and had brought to the front many of the men-such as Hawke and Anson- who were to carry to a triumphant end the struggle whose renewal was only a matter of time. For, like the rivals for Silesia, England and France had suspended hostilities, not because they had abandoned their ambitions, but because they had exhausted their resources.