CHAPTER IV.

ITALY AND HER INVADERS.

IN the latter half of the fifteenth century Italy presented the appearance of comparative calm. Frederick III, in spite of the motto attributed to him, "Alles Erdreich ist Oesterreich untertan," took no step to assert imperial claims in Italy. Conciliar storms had blown over. The condottieri had been tamed; secure for the most part in their little tyrannies they drew the pay of some neighbouring State, and spent it on luxury, literature, and art. If war was on foot, its bitterness was mitigated, at any rate to the soldier, by every courteous device. The clash of party strife was seldom heard, for most cities had bought internal peace at the price of liberty.

Italy possessed her own State system, her own great powers, intent on preserving a balance of forces, her own alliances, triple or dual. At first the north Italian powers had their own league; later the alliance of Milan, Florence, and Naples, promoted and sustained by Lorenzo de' Medici, kept in check the vigilant ambition of Venice, still almost at the height of her power and pride. The smaller powers, Mantua, Ferrara, and the tyrants of the Papal States, in constant dread of their covetous neighbours, leant for support on one or other of the great powers, and did what in them lay to preserve the balance. After the brilliant raid of John, the Angevin duke of Calabria, Ferrante, the bastard of Aragon, ruled Naples in comparative peace. The revolt of his barons was stamped out, without regard for faith or mercy, as befitted a man of that age. The seizure of Otranto by the Turks in 1480 was a warning of external danger that may have assisted to preserve the peace, although all projects of united and offensive resistance to the advancing Mohammadans came to nothing. The equilibrium was unstable, but on the whole it was preserved.

Three of our protagonists, Venice, Florence, the Holy See, have their own place for separate treatment in this volume. Nor is this the occasion to dwell on the petty politics of the many tyrants of the Romagna and central Italy. Naples, however, and Milan require some introduction.

The kingdom of Naples, though still styling itself kingdom of Sicily, had been separated from its island namesake since the Sicilian Vespers, when the Angevin successors of the Suabian kings were driven from the Trinacrian island. In 1435 this Angevin dynasty died out, and its inheritance fell to Alfonso of Aragon, the King of insular Sicily. On his death in 1458 the island kingdom had remained attached to Aragon, while Naples had been devised to his bastard Ferdinand or Ferrante. The political characteristics of the Neapolitan kingdom mark it off sharply from the rest of Italy. Here had survived, though in a debased form, the feudal economy which had long since disappeared further north. Here no elusive ideal of municipal liberty mocked, amid the realities of party strife, the citizens of independent cities. Great feudatories ground down their vassals with all the ingenuity that a new commercial and industrial wisdom inspired. The King, himself a feudatory and tributary of the Holy See, was master of Naples and its castles, and of certain royal dues and domains, but for the rest hung on the goodwill of a score of almost independent princes. Ferrante, greedy, capable, and ruthless, had done much to change all that. He had devised a system of commercial monopolies exercised for the royal benefit, which had considerably increased his revenues. The barons' war had restored to him by confiscation a part of the toll that his commercial partners had levied on his profits, and had crushed the greatest family of the kingdom, the princely house of San Severino. His relations to the papacy had been unfriendly, even warlike, but on the whole he had succeeded in withholding his tribute without losing his fief. But dangers now threatened him at home and abroad. At home, though feared, he was hated. His son Alfonso, the partner of his many cruel and treacherous acts, was equally detested. Zealous enemies were working against him, especially at the Court of France. The de facto ruler of Milan had wronged him in the person of his grand-daughter. The illegitimate son of an usurper, he held his crown by no hereditary right, and rumours came from beyond the Alps that a stronger claimant was astir.

Thus at the time when our story begins, the whole force and policy of Milan was moved at the will of one man. Ludovico, called the Duke of Bari from the Neapolitan fief he owned, and known from his complexion as the Moor, made a great impression on the men of his time. He was a master of every political art as then understood by Italian statesmen. By his wisdom he had risen, and by it he aspired to dominate Italy. Mistakes he made, no doubt, as for instance in marrying his nephew to the Neapolitan princess. But his versatile and unscrupulous intelligence, well served by his agents with information from every Court, was never at a loss for an expedient to meet a difficulty. His weakness was partly the weakness of his school of statesmanship, in which good faith and consistency were not valued as political qualities. A more serious defect was the lack of courage and nerve which he showed under the stress of danger. His munificence towards artists and men of letters, his luxurious and noble ostentation, while they tended no doubt to diminish his unpopularity, proved a heavy burden on his finances, and increased the weight of his exactions.

With full consciousness of their own weakness, and sincere mutual distrust, the Italian powers had watched the growth of France. French intervention in Italy was no new thing. While her strength was yet immature, France had given one race of kings to Naples, and had endeavoured to give another. Charles VII had driven the English from France, and before his death Genoa had asked and received French protection and a French governor. Louis XI found that Genoa had revolted, but was too wise to waste his resources on distant enterprises, and gave no material aid to the ill-fated quest of John of Calabria as a pretender to the kingdom of Naples. Louis devoted his whole energy to the union of France under his absolute rule; but he never lost sight of the affairs of Italy. The powers of Italy abased themselves before him in rivalry to win his favour. He answered them impartially with good words and maintained them in slavish expectation of good services. Thus the French King came to be more and more regarded as the arbiter of Italian fortunes. The presents made to his ambassadors and courtiers and their reception when they visited Italy assisted to foster the belief that Italy was rich, disunited, and helpless, an easy prey to a militant monarchy. There was no reason to believe that the successor of Louis would be hampered by his difficulties or inclined to his reserve.

Ludovico deserves the doubtful credit of having been the first to bring his goods to market. French ambition had two excuses for intervention in Italy. The first was the claim of Orleans to Milan, resting on the marriage of Valentina Visconti to the first Duke of Orleans, and on the marriage contract of Valentina, confirmed by Clement VII, in which her right to succeed to her father in default of male heirs was recognised. There seems also to have been a will of Gian Galeazzo Visconti, securing the succession to her male issue in default of the direct male line; but Ludovico alone knew of this and caused all known copies to be destroyed. Legal objections might be urged against all these grounds of claim, but they were good enough to support a dynastic war. Louis of Orleans had in 1491 recovered his favour at Court, and it was not impossible that Milan would be made the object of the French attack. Milan lay dangerously near to France, and strategically was much less difficult of access than Naples. On the other hand Charles might well be unwilling to aggrandise one of the most powerful of his nobles, a possible heir to the throne, who, though reconciled, had not long ago been in arms against his King. It was Ludovico's natural policy to endeavour to divert this danger from himself.

Thus there were two paths open to the ambition of the French king, when freed from the prudent tutelage of his sister Anne. The head of the young monarch was filled with chimerical dreams. His domestic troubles had been satisfactorily composed. His standing force of cavalry, fitted alike for the shock of battle, for scouting and skirmishing, and for missile tactics, was full of military enthusiasm and wanted work. His artillery was far ahead of any other in Europe. His infantry was less satisfactory, but could be strengthened from abroad. He had himself but lately come to man's estate and was eager to prove himself a man and a king. At his Court were the Neapolitan exiles, especially the San Severino princes, eager to press on him a definite plan of conquest. He was estranged from the wise counsellors who had kept him so long in leading-strings. Supple courtiers and men of business, Etienne de Vesc, and Guillaume Briconnet, were at his side, ready to find means for the execution of any scheme that pleased their royal master, and promised to them incidental profits. The crown of Sicily carried with it the crown of Jerusalem, thus suggesting at once and facilitating an ulterior project of crusade; and Europe needed a crusade.

The Moor was probably the first among the Italian princes to see that French intervention in Italy, so often talked of, had at length become a real danger. He approached the King of France in 1491, and received from him in the name of his nephew the investiture of Genoa, which had been similarly granted to Francesco, his father, by Louis XI. In 1492 he obtained the renewal of the alliance formerly enjoyed by his father, thus recovering the position of favour which his elder brother had lost through his indiscreet leanings towards Charles the Bold.

The events of the next two years illustrate the unstable nature of Italian policy and Italian alliances. Lorenzo de' Medici died in April, 1492, while the Milanese embassy was at Paris. The choice before his son Piero was a difficult one. It was the traditional policy of Florence to keep up intimate, almost subservient, relations with France, where the commercial and financial interests of the Medici Bank were important, but on the other hand to prevent, if possible, active foreign interference in Italy. These -two aims were probably now no longer to be reconciled; and Piero sacrificed the first without attaining the second. Following, as it seems, the counsels of Virginio Orsini, his wife's cousin, he drew closer to Naples, thus alarming and alienating Ludovico, who soon afterwards concluded an alliance with Venice and Rome. Piero rejected all overtures from France; and the opening campaign was preceded by the expulsion of the Medici agents from French territory.

The accession of Alexander VI in August, 1492, seemed at first a great good fortune for Ludovico; for his brother, the Cardinal Ascanio Sforza, was reputed to have supreme influence with the new pontiff. A little matter, the sale by Franceschetto Cibo, son of the late Pope, of two places in the Patrimonio, Anguillara and Cervetri, to Virginio Orsini, the friend of Piero and captain general of Naples, assisted the secret endeavours of Ascanio to animate the Pope against Naples and Florence. The league of the Pope with Milan and Venice, and an indirect encouragement of France in her plans against Naples, were results of this ill-feeling. But the dread of a General Council, of which Charles had rashly spoken, may have inclined Alexander to entertain the pressing solicitations of Ferrante, supported by the offer of an advantageous marriage for one of Alexander's sons to a Neapolitan princess. The Pope allowed his anger to be appeased, and in August, 1493, returned an evasive answer to the confident request of Perron de Baschi, the French envoy, for the investiture of Naples, with a free passage and the supply of provisions for French troops. After the death of Ferrante in January, 1494, Alexander confirmed the investiture to his son Alfonso, and in February he solemnly warned the French King against disturbing the peace of Christian Italy.

Before the French King took the final step, it had been necessary for him to surmount serious difficulties. The marriage of Charles with Anne of Britanny had involved France in hostilities with a league of powers. On the north, Henry VII descended and laid siege to Boulogne. England was bought off, by the treaty of Etaples (November, 1492), with an exorbitant money ransom, which caused Henry VII to forget that he had ever felt himself threatened by the presence of the French in Britanny. On the south France was menaced by the recently consolidated and extended kingdoms of Aragon and Castile. Their neutrality was purchased (January, 1493) by the retrocession without indemnity of the counties of Roussillon and Cerdagne, on the northward slope of the Eastern Pyrenees, pledged in 1462 to Louis XI by John of Aragon for 300,000 crowns. Maximilian, King of the Romans, had not only been robbed of his Breton marriage, but had also a claim under the treaty of Arras to the restitution of Franche Comte and Artois, with some minor places, part of the heritage of Charles the Bold. Under that treaty these provinces had been given to France as the dowry of Maximilian's daughter, whom Charles had now repudiated. In the war which followed this double wrong Maximilian had achieved partial, though for him unusual, success. His honour was satisfied, moreover he was now deserted by his allies. He could the more willingly accept the terms of the treaty of Senlis (May, 1493), which gave him in effect almost all there was left to give. The opportunity offered by this reconciliation Ludovico was not slow to seize. With the consent of France he gave to Maximilian the hand of his niece, Bianca Maria, with her more than princely dowry. In the following year Maximilian, who had in the interval succeeded to the empire, redeemed his obligation by bestowing on Ludovico the investiture of Milan, a little before the opportune death of Gian Galeazzo.

Meanwhile the King had actually crossed the Alps by the Mont Genevre, his heavy artillery being sent by sea to Genoa. In Savoy, subject to French influence since Louis XI, no courtesy or facility was denied him. The Marquis of Montferrat put himself and his lands at the King's service. At Asti, which belonged to Orleans, the Dukes of Bari and Ferrara greeted the King; and the news of the victory of Rapallo was brought. Here a mild attack of small-pox delayed the King for a short time, and the general disorganisation was increased by an access of fever which prostrated the Duke of Orleans. The King having recovered, it was determined that Louis should stay behind at Asti. In absolute lack of money the King had to raise a loan by the help of the credit of Ludovico, from whom much more liberal assistance had been expected.

Sforza at Imola and Forli was doubtful. These troops were opposed by Milanese under the Count of Caiazzo, and French under Aubigny; but, when Charles had decided to advance through Tuscany, the operations in Romagna lost their meaning and the allies withdrew. Charles passed through Pavia, where he visited Gian Galeazzo. At Piacenza he heard of the young duke's death. As far as Pontremoli he marched over Milanese soil. Thence, descending the Apennines, he advanced into Florentine territory and attacked Sarzana. Had Sarzana and Pietra Santa been strongly defended, the country at this point presented serious difficulties to an advancing army. The land on either side of the road was marshy, and the fortresses were well capable of defence. But Piero, unsupported and unprepared, had at length determined to give in. He knew that there were many in Florence who were favourable to France, and hostile to himself. Acting on his own responsibility, while Sarzana still held out, he came to the French camp at San Stefano and surrendered everything,-Sarzana, Pietra Santa, Pisa, and Livorno,-and promised the King a considerable loan. But his submission came too late. When he returned to Florence, he found the palace of the Signoria closed to him; the city rose against him, and he was obliged to fly with his brother, the young Cardinal Giovanni.

Nothing now remained to delay Charles' advance to Florence. Into Lucca the King made a triumphant entry. At Pisa he was received with acclamations, and in a hasty speech was understood to have restored its liberty to the city, where he left a small garrison. Finally, on the 17th of November, the King entered Florence with 8,000 horse and 4,000 infantry, in a martial array such as never had been seen before. The whole city received him with eager hopes and fervent affection. Before he had left, however, some change of feeling had set in. The behaviour of the French soldiers was not all that could be desired. Wages were in arrear, and they could not, if they wished, pay for all they needed. But to women it is admitted that they did no wrong; and, indeed, the conduct of the French towards non-combatants throughout these wars compares favourably with that of Italians, Spaniards, Germans, or Swiss. But there were other grievances. Charles had put off' all negotiations until after his entry. The deliberations that followed were not always peaceful. The King was suspected, and not wholly without cause, of wishing to restore Piero. His financial demands were considered excessive, and even after abatement still remained large. He insisted on retaining Pisa and Livorno, Sarzana and Pietra Santa, till the end of the campaign. But the freedom of Pisa was not among the stipulations. A French envoy was to be present at all deliberations of the Signoria. In the discussions which ensued bold words were used. The Florentine Capponi threatened to call the citizens to arms. But the King was the stronger, and finally his principal demands were accepted.

Reluctantly, sullenly, Alexander came to terms. The King was to Have the custody of Jem, who might be Used in the proposed crusade to stir up rebellion against Bayazid. The Cardinal of Valencia, Cesare Borgia, was to accompany Charles, nominally as legate, really as a hostage. The Pope promised no investiture; indeed, he had every reason to be satisfied with the moderation, perhaps with the simplicity, of his visitor. The hostile cardinals were bitterly disappointed.

Charles was thus master of the capital, and the more distant provinces showed willingness to accept his rule. He showed a praiseworthy desire to win the goodwill of his new subjects, remitting taxes, as he says, to the amount of more than 200,000 ducats. A general amnesty to those who had served the Aragon kings, restoration of property to the Angevin exiles, even the recognition of slavery as then existing, proved his desire to respect all rights. But impatient of business, given up to pleasure, indolently desirous to satisfy all petitioners, he not only squandered the royal domain, but created almost as many grievances as he bestowed favours. No serious attempt was made to settle the government on a firm basis.

The project of a crusade had received a grave blow in the death of Jem, which took place at Naples. The Archbishop of Durazzo undertook to organise a rising in Albania, but the project was frustrated by his accidental arrest at Venice. Charles' own position was too doubtful to allow any more determined effort. Since his refusal to confer Sarzana and Pietra Santa upon Ludovico, the latter had been intriguing against his ally. Ferdinand of Aragon had sent to Sicily the great captain Gonzalo de Cordova with a fleet, ostensibly for defensive purposes. Venice was arming, as she said, against the Turk. Maximilian was afraid that the successes of Charles in Italy might lead him to claim the Imperial Crown. Negotiations took place at Venice resulting in a league between the Pope, the Roman King, Ferdinand and Isabella, Venice and Milan, for the protection of the confederates against the aggression of other powers then possessing states in Italy. The league purported to be defensive, but was in reality offensive. Florence alone, still friendly to France and relying on her good offices to recover Pisa, was not a party to it. The transaction was communicated to Commines, French ambassador to Venice, on the 1st of April. Charles was soon informed of the danger rising in his rear, but did not leave Naples till the 21st of May.

Novara by the invitation of the citizens; shortly after, the citadel surrendered. Ludovico was paralysed; it is thought that if the Duke of Orleans had marched on Milan he would have met no serious resistance.

Meanwhile the King had left Naples with some 1,200 French lances, 4,000 Swiss, and 2,000 Gascon arblasters. The other half of his army, partly Italians, was left with Montpensier, the viceroy, to deal with Ferrantino, who had recently landed in Calabria with Spanish aid. On reaching Rome, the King found the Pope had fled to Orvieto. Florence Charles avoided, since the Florentines claimed, and he was determined to refuse, the surrender of the fortresses, especially of Pisa. At Pisa he found himself equally unable to satisfy the Pisans. At Spezia, against all sound advice, he detached 500 horse and 2,000 foot to operate against Genoa with the aid of the fleet and the Genoese exiles. But he had the forethought to send on a force to occupy Pontremoli, which capitulated. The Swiss, violating the terms of the surrender, sacked and burned the place, destroying valuable stores.

The possession of Pontremoli gave the French access to the pass. Beyond the summit lay the army of the League. The chief part of the army, about 40,000 strong, was in Venetian pay, and commanded by the Marquis of Mantua. Beside men at arms there were some thousands of Stradioti, the ferocious light cavalry of Albania. The chief part of the forces of Milan was engaged in the siege -of Novara, but a Milanese contingent was present. Over the steep pass the Swiss, in sign of penitence for their late excesses, dragged by hand the heavy cannon, each ordinarily drawn by thirty-five horses; and French nobles, notably la Tremouille, did not disdain to work beside them. At Fornovo the French vanguard came into touch with the Stradiot advanced posts, and halted. The rest of the army, coming up, encamped for the night in great lack of provisions. Negotiations were opened for a free passage, but came to nothing. The next day the French advanced.

At Asti the King found things in forlorn case. The expedition against Genoa had failed. The French fleet was captured in Rapallo by a superior Genoese force and all the plunder of Naples was lost. The Duke of Orleans was besieged at Novara, and his garrison were at the last pinch. Bessey was sent in haste to raise a fresh force of Swiss, but by the time they arrived, 20,000 strong, Novara had capitulated on easy terms, and Ludovico showed himself inclined for peace. Louis of Orleans was anxious to use the Swiss against Milan, but Charles, perhaps disgusted with the shifting fortune of war, concluded at Vercelli a separate peace with Ludovico, and on the 15th of October he crossed the Alps.

Gonzalo and Ferrantino at Atella. The chief part of the French prisoners, including Montpensier, succumbed to the climate and to disease. Aubigny gave up the struggle in Calabria. On the death of Ferrantino, October 6, 1496, Federigo, his uncle, succeeded. Soon after (November 19) Gaeta> the last important stronghold of the French, surrendered. The king of France still meditated another expedition, and concluded, towards the end of 1497, an alliance with Aragon for a joint conquest. Five months later an accident cut short his life. The only son of his marriage with Anne of Britanny had died in infancy. His successor, Louis of Orleans,, inherited his plans of conquest, but with a difference.

The fear of a new French invasion, increased by the league concluded with France in 1496 by the majority of the Swiss Cantons, worked upon Italian nerves. The restless Ludovico first took the alarm, and approached the Venetian Signoria. It was agreed to call in the King of the Romans, who responded to the call. Maximilian agreed, like a mere condottiere, to take the pay of the league, which was composed as in 1495,, with the addition of Henry VII of England. In July, 1496, a conference was held at Mals in the Tyrol near the frontier. The members of the league gave diplomatic support, but none were ready to give material help, except Milan and Venice; and even these doled out their pittance with a chary hand. Maximilian had a name to sell, but few men and less money to back it. The imperial Estates and the much discussed imperial subsidy afforded no help. However some Swiss were enrolled,, and Maximilian raised a few horsemen from his own subjects and personal adherents. By the "fend of September a small army had collected around the Roman King at Vigevano in the Milanese.

Delays were many, but at length the allied force moved from Genoa, partly by land, partly by sea. It was now October, and the autumnal gales imperilled and impeded the naval force. The land forces suffered equally from heavy rains. At length Maximilian reached Pisa. The united army reached the total of about 2,500 horse and 4,000 foot. With this inadequate power, ill-provided with heavy artillery, Maximilian, himself literally penniless, determined to undertake the siege of Livorno, the last outlet of Florence to the sea. The Venetian and Genoese fleet moved up and occupied the harbour, while Maximilian directed the land attack. The town was in evil case, supplies short, the garrison weak and demoralised. But aid was promptly sent from Florence, and on the 29th of October a French squadron sailed in, favoured by a stormy wind which prevented the allied fleet from offering opposition. A fortnight later, while the Genoese were disputing the orders of the King, the Frenchmen sailed out again, leaving 500 soldiers and abundant stores. The weather, rainy and cold, discouraged and incapacitated the besiegers. Discipline was bad, and nioney scarce. Maximilian therefore determined to raise the siege and discussed the chances of a direct attack on Florence; Soon that was also given up, and he left hurriedly for Lombardy, perhaps disturbed by rumours of an attack upon his line of retreat. By the beginning of December he was at Pavia. Here he heard that Ferdinand of Aragon had concluded a truce with France. Alarmed perhaps for his own hereditary dominions and for the empire, certainly disgusted with all he had seen and suffered in Italy, Maximilian hurried across the Alps, there to expend his desultory vigour in other plans, fruitless indeed and unpractical, but none more fantastic and fruitless than the enterprise of Pisa.

Meanwhile Ludovico had not been idle. At every court his envoys met the ambassadors of France, and fought an unequal diplomatic fight. Maximilian was friendly, but he was engaged during the crisis in unsuccessful warfare with the Swiss. He took Ludovico's money, but gave him no material aid. Naples, reduced to famine by the ravages of war, was benevolent but helpless. The smaller powers, Mantua, Ferrara, Bologna, jealous as they were of Venice, were yet more afraid. They gave willingly good words, but took no compromising step. The Marquis of Mantua indeed, after much haggling, accepted a condotta from Ludovico, but was careful not to carry out its obligations. One ally Ludovico had, or at least professed to have,-the enemy of Christendom, the Turk, who did much harm to Venice^during and after the war of Milan, and even raided Friuli, and the march of Treviso. But Ludovico was not to gain by this.

Thrown thus upon his own resources, he was in fact beaten before the war began. His frontier was long, and not naturally defensible. He had to fear attacks from every side. The spring and summer of 1499 were spent in feverish attempts to organise defence. A large number of infantry was raised in the Milanese, and distributed in the strong towns and on the frontiers. A few Swiss and Germans were hired. Efforts were made to collect mercenary horse, with moderate success; but the most important contingent, that promised from Naples under Prospero Colonna, was detained at home. Much labour was spent on the frontier fortresses. Alessandria in particular was thought to have been made very strong. The brothers San Severino, in whom the Duke had complete confidence, were put in the chief commands, and returned favourable reports to their master. The Duke flattered himself that his State could hold out for a time even against the overwhelming odds. If time were allowed, the powers of Germany might be set in motion.

The French, after capturing the strong place of Annone, where they massacred the garrison, occupied Valenza, Tortona, and some places of less importance, and then (August 25) closed in upon Alessandria, which was held in strength by Galeazzo San Severino. Galeazzo could not rely on his troops, inferior as they were, and ill-paid. His communications were threatened. Faithful himself, he could not trust his own brothers. On the fourth day after the invading army had encamped before the town, Galeazzo and his principal officers took to flight, and the city at once fell to the French. This was practically the end of the war. On the 30th of August there were some signs of disquiet in Milan. The Duke's treasurer Landriano was killed in the street. On the 2nd of September Ludovico quitted Milan with his treasure, still considerable, and made his way by Como and the Valtellina into Tyrol. The castle of Milan, entrusted by the Duke to his most trusted friend, Bernardino da Corte, was sold by him to the French for the equivalent of some 150,000 ducats. No further opposition was made. The duchy was occupied by the French on the west of the Adda, by Venice to the east. Beyond the Po, Parma and Piacenza, with their dependent territory, submitted without resistance to the French.

Meanwhile Ludovico in the Tyrol had succeeded in procuring a truce between Maximilian and the Swiss (September 22). With the aid of Maximilian, more valuable in the Tyrol than elsewhere, and by the expenditure of a part of his hoard, he gradually collected a force. 1,500 men at arms reached him from Burgundy; the mercenary Swiss accepted his pay; finally he beat up a motley army of some 20,000 men. While Ludovico advanced from Bormio, Galeazzo came by Aosta through Savoy with a considerable body of Swiss. Ligny attempted to resist at Como, but his strength was insufficient. Trivulzio ordered him to retreat on Milan. Thence the French retired to Novara, and Mortara, where they were joined (February 13) by Yves d'Allegre with the lances and infantry that Louis had lent to Cesare for the conquest of Imola and Forli. Other scattered forces having come in, the French could now hold their own until the arrival of reinforcements.

On the 5th of February Ludovico re-entered Milan, greeted by enthusiastic shouts of " Moro, Moro." His partisans showed some zeal in subscribing to replenish his partly exhausted treasury; but the most extreme measures were needed to supply the necessary funds. Even the treasures of the churches were not spared. Such resources could suffice for a time, but before the end of March they showed signs of failure. While vain efforts were made to reduce the Castle of Milan, Ludovico advanced with his army by Pavia to Vigevano, which he captured with its castle, and thence after some desultory warfare he moved against Novara (March 5), where was Yves d'Allegre with a sufficient garrison, still further strengthened a day or two later. But the inhabitants were hostile, and provisions scarce, so that the French were obliged to accept a favourable capitulation (March 21).

There were Swiss in both armies, and it was likely that they would refuse to fight against their countrymen. The French levy had official authority; the French chests were full. Thus when the French army moved forward against the Milanese at Novara, almost the whole ducal army abandoned him. Further resistance was impossible. Ludovico attempted to escape in disguise among the Swiss, but was detected and became a prisoner (April 10). His captivity was only terminated by his death. His brother Ascanio was captured by the Venetians and handed over later to the French. The sons of Ludovico were safe in Germany. The little son of Gian Galeazzo fell into the hands of France.

For the reorganisation of the duchy the King sent his own right hand, the Cardinal of Rouen, Georges d'Amboise. Trivulzio was superseded in the civil government by Charles d'Amboise, Seigneur de Chaumont, the Cardinal's nephew, and in the military command by Aubigny.

With the completed conquest of Milan French predominance in the peninsula was established. Venice was content to accept the situation for the present, and to make use of her powerful friend, who sent ships to cooperate in her war with the Turks during the years 1499-1501. The Pope was fain to lean on France. French troops assisted Cesare in the conquest of Imola and Forli and afterwards served him against Rimini, Pesaro and Faenza. His further conquests were limited by French sufferance. When he threatened Bologna or Florence, he was warned off by their august protector. In the enterprise of Naples, Cesare followed the French banner as a willing ally, almost as a subject. During the time of Ludovico's success several of the Italian States had given him help, or shown him goodwill. After his fall, the Duke of Ferrara, the Marquis of Mantua, Bentivoglio of Bologna, and others, were forced to pay compensation to France for their incautious actions. Florence reaped the reward of her more correct behaviour, when the King sent Beaumont with French troops to assist the Florentines against Pisa. The failure of the expedition brought Florence into temporary disgrace, but later she was allowed to buy her pardon. Thus in Lom-bardy, in Tuscany, in the Papal States, there was no power that did not accept as a fact the predominance of France.

Nor could the King of Sicily remain a tranquil spectator, while his neighbour and relative was displaced by a new and aggressive power. Louis determined to compromise, and (November, 1500) concluded at Granada a secret treaty with Aragon for a joint conquest of Naples, conceding to Ferdinand a fair half of the kingdom, and, provisionally, the provinces of Apulia and Calabria.

Strengthened by this compact, Louis was free to move. In May, 1501, his army was ready in Lombardy. With the certainty of Spanish aid, 1,000 lances, 4,000 Swiss, and 6,000 French infantry were held sufficient. The command was divided between Aubigny, the Count of Caiazzo (Francesco di San Severino), and the Duke of Valentinois. A fleet under Ravenstein was operating on the coast from the convenient base of Genoa. Federigo relied on help from Sicily, where was the great Gonzalo, who had recently returned from a successful expedition against the Turks, and who, acting under orders, was careful not to undeceive him. The first news of the coalition came to Naples from Rome, where in June Alexander issued a bull depriving Federigo of his throne and confirming the partition already arranged between the Kings of France and Aragon. In July the French army reached Capua, which was held by Fabrizio Colonna with a sufficient force. But the French artillery soon made a practicable breach, and, while terms of surrender were being discussed, the French were admitted into the town, which they sacked with every circumstance of cruelty and outrage. There was no further resistance. On August 2 Federigo retired to Ischia, and after a time decided to accept the asylum offered to him by Louis, who provided him with a rich endowment and an honourable position in France. On August 4 French garrisons occupied the castles of Naples, and la Palice was sent to hold the Abruzzi. Louis d'Armagnac, duke of Nemours, was appointed viceroy of the newly acquired kingdom.

Meanwhile Gonzalo without difficulty occupied his master's share of the kingdom of Naples, and was joined by Prospero and Fabrizio Colonna, whose family was about this time expelled from their possessions in papal territory, while Cesare, their bitterest enemy, was leagued with the French. Only at Taranto was there considerable resistance. Here lay Federigo's son, Ferrante. The town was strong, but a siege by sea and land compelled it after a stout resistance to come to terms (March, 1502). Gonzalo promised his liberty to Ferrante, but the Spanish King disregarded the promise, and caused the young prince to be sent in custody to Spain.

At the very crisis of the war Louis had been entangled in a futile negotiation. Since the end of 1500 Philip, Archduke of Austria, had been busying himself with the double object of securing his dominions in the Netherlands against France, and of obtaining for his infant son, the Duke of Luxemburg, afterwards Charles V, additions by marriage to those vast possessions to which he was already heir presumptive. The outcome of these efforts was a contract of betrothal at Lyons (August, 1501) between Charles and Claude, the daughter of Louis XII: a provisional treaty at Trent between Maximilian and Louis (October, 1501) agreeing to this marriage, and stipulating the investiture of Milan for Louis : an interpretation of the same arranged between Philip and Louis in December of the same year at Blois, but never accepted by Maximilian: and finally a treaty concluded by Philip with Louis at Lyons (April 5, 1503), in the name of Ferdinand and Isabella, by which the whole of the kingdom of Naples was to be given to the infant pair. This last treaty was never ratified by Ferdinand and Isabella, who asserted that Philip had exceeded his powers, and Gonzalo paid no heed to it. But Louis showed less prudence. Relying on the treaty, he deferred, in the critical month of April, the despatch of a body of troops which he had ready in Genoa. It is true that the threatening movements of the Swiss, to whom Louis was obliged at this moment to cede Bellinzona, gave an additional reason for delaying what had been already too long delayed.

The disasters and humiliation of the year called for a great effort. The French raised three armies, one of which was directed on the Spanish frontier of Navarre and another against Roussillon, while the third was intended for the recovery of Naples. The Italian expedition was entrusted to la Tremouille. The northern powers of Italy remained to all appearance faithful. Ferrara, Mantua, Bologna, Florence furnished contingents. In August the French were beginning to move. The Pope and Cesare vacillated long between the parties, but at the crisis they were both stricken down by illness, and on the 18th of August the Pope expired. The ambassadors and the cardinals succeeded in freeing the town from the armed men of rival factions, Orsini, Colonna, Cesare; but Gonzalo was at Castiglione, and the French advanced guard at Nepi, so that the election took place as it were under the shadow of war. It wisely ended by giving the prize to neither of the foreign nations. The new Pope, Pius III (Francesco Piccolomini), treated Cesare with indulgence and left him in a position to bargain with both Spain and France. However, his final adhesion to the latter power proved to be of little value, while both Orsini and Colonna were thereby driven into the arms of Spain.

The fortune of war had decided against Louis. He was fain to heal his wounded pride by new treaties of marriage which recognised his rights and promised to enrich his offspring at the expense of France. By the treaty of Blois with Maximilian (September, 1504), Claude, already heiress of Britanny, was to receive Milan with Genoa and Asti, the duchy of Burgundy with Macon and Auxerre, and the county of Blois, as a dowry on her marriage with Charles. In return the King of the Romans conferred upon Louis the investiture of Milan for a cash consideration. A separate and secret treaty stipulated a joint attack on Venice. An arrangement made at Hagenau (April, 1505), between the same and Archduke Philip, contemplated the addition of Naples to this ample endowment. But in October of this year, at Blois, Louis preferred to give the kingdom of Naples as a dowry to his relative, Germaine of Foix, on her marriage with Ferdinand of Aragon ; and Ferdinand so far recognised the rights of Louis that he promised a compensation of 1,000,000 ducats, and, in default of heirs of the marriage, the reversion of the kingdom to the Most Christian King. It was settled that an amnesty should be granted to the barons who had supported the Angevin cause, and that restitution of property should be made as far as possible. As a sign of restored amity, an interview took place at Savona, under circumstances of unusual trustfulness, between the sovereigns (June, 1507).

The arrangements mentioned above did not affect the actual position of Italian affairs. Indeed, all dispositions depending on the marriage of Claude and Charles were rendered void by the decision of Louis in 1506 to bestow his daughter's hand on the heir presumptive of France, Francis of Angouleme. The years following the disastrous wars of Naples were years of uneasy watchfulness, of bewildering arrangements and re-arrangements of unstable leagues and combinations, of mendacious protestations of friendship, and treacherous provocations addressed to jealousy and greed. The inheritance of the Duke of Valentinois was gathered in by his enemies, Orsini, Colonna, Venice, and Giuliano della Rovere, who as Julius II succeeded the short-lived Piccolomini. Cesare himself, a prisoner in Spain, added another to the list of those whose trust in Ferdinand proved their ruin. The war of Florence with Pisa continued, but barely interested any one besides the belligerents. Gradually, from an old man's passion, as from live fire hidden under blackened embers, infectious energy spread through Italy and through Europe. Cesare Borgia's conquests and fall had brought almost all of the Romagna and the March of Ancona under the I direct control of the Holy See. The ambition of Julius would be satisfied with nothing less than the whole of what had ever been claimed by the successors of Peter. Venice first earned his hatred by refusing to give up Faenza and Rimini, which she had occupied after the death of Alexander. The secret treaty of Blois gave Julius hopes of a speedy revenge. But that treaty remained without effect, and Julius had to wait, exercising a violent self-restraint, and evincing qualities, not natural in him, of patience, reticence, and duplicity. Practising simony and extortion on the grand scale, he slowly replenished the papal treasury, which had been plundered by Cesare Borgia on Alexander's death. Then (1506), reckoning that swift and sudden action might reach its effect before either Venice or France decided to offer opposition, he struck a rapid blow at two usurpers of St Peter's rights. • At Perugia Giampaolo Baglione made complete submission. Against Bologna the French themselves sent troops to aid the Pope, unwilling, when they saw he was in earnest, to risk the loss of his friendship. Giovanni Bentivoglio and his sons, hopeless of successful resistance, took to flight. The Pope set up his own government in the town.

The fears that had disturbed Julius when he heard of the powerful expedition against Genoa proved vain. Nothing was attempted, if anything had been imagined, against the Holy Father. But the interview at Savona (June, 1507), which followed shortly, was calculated to cause him not less serious alarm. Ferdinand had sought, but had not received, the investiture of Naples, and had shown his resentment by avoiding an interview at Ostia, which the Pope had wished. We do not know what the Kings may have discussed at Savona; the secrecy observed at the time still baffles the curiosity of investigators. There was grave matter for deliberation. Maximilian, the inveterate enemy of Louis, and the rival of Ferdinand for the regency of Castile, was making serious preparations for a descent into Italy, with tha-ostensible purpose of obtaining the imperial crown, and the probable intention of driving the French from Milan. Common measures may have been considered against this common foe; joint action against Julius may also have been proposed. But the document from Simancas published by Maulde seems to prove that the Kings finally decided to attempt a league in which Julius and Maximilian should be included as friends. The careful exclusion of all other powers from the projected league seems to indicate an intended victim, to whose sacrificial feast all four could be invited, with the prospect, if not the certainty, of a favourable reply. The oath of Louis at Savona foreshadows the League of Cambray. Venice is not mentioned, but no other solution satisfies the conditions of the enigma.

If such a league as that of Cambray was projected at Savona, Maximilian's unconcerted action assisted the plan. Enraged at the repeated refusals of Venice to grant him a free passage, he attacked the republic in February, 1508. The fortunes of war were against him. The French stood by their ally. Pitigliano held his own in the Veronese, while Alviano in the east took Gorz and Trieste in the hereditary lands of the enemy and threatened a further advance. The " elected Roman Emperor," as he now called himself, was fain in June to conclude for three years a humiliating truce, by which Venice retained her conquests. In this truce the King of France was himself included, and he wished the Duke of Gelders, his own ally, and Maximilian's obdurate enemy, to be also comprised; but Venice, with unusual imprudence, allowed the wishes of her reputed friend to remain unsatisfied.

The first impulse of the proud Republic was to bow before the storm. France was allowed to occupy Bergamo and Brescia, Crema and Cremona, almost unopposed. The visdomino, whom the Signoria had some years before set up at Ferrara as a mark of suzerainty, was driven out. The restitution of the towns of Romagna and other concessions were offered to the Pope, and shortly afterwards the Romagna was actually evacuated. Verona, Vicenza, and Padua were allowed to give themselves up to emissaries, real or' pretended, of the Emperor. Treviso was still held, but the recent conquests to the east of Venice were given up. The towns in Apulia were abandoned. Meanwhile every effort was made to strengthen the narrower line of defence. Fresh troops were raised, and money and stores collected; while on the other hand attempts were made to open negotiations, with the allies severally, and especially with the Pope.

Milanese, and the Pope withdrew his men. Vicenza speedily returned to Venetian rule, and Verona alone of the more important places remained in imperial hands.

In February, 1510, the Venetians at length came to terms with the Pope. His conditions were hard, but they were accepted. Venice recognised in full the immunities of the clergy and the papal right to provide to all Venetian benefices, renounced all unauthorised treaties concluded with towns in the Papal States, abandoned all intention of appealing to a council against the papal bans, and conceded free navigation of the Adriatic to all papal subjects, among whom Ferrara was expressly included. In return, the Pope admitted the humble request of the Republic for pardon, and promised his good offices in future. The Venetians were allowed to recruit in the Papal States, where they engaged several famous condottierl, among others Giampaolo Baglione, and Renzo da Ceri. Thus the first aim of Julius was secured. He had humiliated the Queen of the Adriatic, and recovered all rights usurped by Venice from the Holy See. He was now at liberty to turn his attention to his second object, the expulsion from Italy of the "Barbarians"-in the first place of the French. For this purpose he hoped to win the aid of the Emperor and of Henry VIII. But abundant patience was needed before this could be brought about. The first effect of the Pope's change of policy was rather to increase the bitterness of Maximilian against the Venetians, so that he tried to induce the Turk to attack them. With the King of Aragon Julius was not at first much more successful. Ferdinand accepted the investiture of Naples, but showed no inclination to an open breach with the league. There remained the Swiss.

The Swiss were poor and ignorant, their general Diet ill-instructed and impotent, their leading men needy and venal, their common men ready to follow any liberal recruiting officer, and even the cantonal governments lacked coercive force. Thus the fine military qualities so often displayed by them in these wars had hitherto served only to win the mercenary's pittance. French victories would have been impossible without Swiss aid; French disasters had fallen mainly on the Swiss. But latterly they had risen to a higher sense of their own value; their arrogant behaviour and exorbitant demands had begun to fatigue the French paymaster. Relations, which had never been easy, had now become decidedly unfriendly; for the French King had refused the Swiss terms, and discharged his unruly levies, intending in future to draw his infantry from Germany, the Orisons, and the Valais. Moreover the ten years' treaty of 1499 had run to a close, and Louis showed no great eagerness for its renewal.

The Swiss also aided the papal plans, while making war for the first time on their own behalf. The failure of 1510 still rankled, and the commercial hostility of the Forest Cantons together with the hope of Milanese booty predisposed not only the soldiers of fortune, but also the governments, to warlike action. ,A grievance of Schwyz having been lightly treated by Louis, the Schwyzers took up arms (November, 1511) and summoned their allies. The call was obeyed, and towards the end of the month troops were collecting on the old marshalling ground between the lakes. Venetian aid was solicited and promised. Gaston de Foix, now Governor of Milan, was menaced at the same time on the side of Parma and Bologna. With the scanty forces at his disposal he could only impede, not prevent, the advance of the enemy towards Milan. But there the Swiss successes ended. They were unable to undertake the siege of Milan. No help came from Venice or the Pope; and the invaders were obliged to retreat, which they did in great disorder.

The Swiss Diet had in April determined to act in concert with the League. The effort which followed was national and imposing. The Swiss army, not less than 20,000 strong, was mustered at Chur, and thence made its way by different paths to Trent, where Venetian emissaries welcomed them. The Spanish and papal army was advancing to occupy Rimini, Cesena, Ravenna, and threatening Bologna. The Venetian forces joined the Swiss at Villafranca in the Veronese, after Schinner had with difficulty dispelled the suspicions and satisfied the demands of these dangerous allies. La Palice had garrisoned the most important places, and lay in the neighbourhood ready to repeat the defensive strategy which had proved so useful in 1510 and 1511. But his forces were insufficient, and, on his retiring to Cremona, they were still further diminished by the loss of 4000 Landsknechte, withdrawn by the Emperor's command. Thence la Palice fell back to Pizzighetone, and again to Pavia, whence, a few days after the arrival of the enemy on the 14th of June, he again retreated, not without difficulty. Hereupon the French, abandoning all further resistance, made for the Alps. Meanwhile Trivulzio had evacuated Milan. Only the castles of Milan, Cremona, and Brescia, and the Lanterna of Genoa were still in French hands.

The complicated problems had not been solved, and, before Julius' death in February, 1513, new difficulties had arisen. In order to secure the recognition of his Lateran Council by Maximilian, Julius had to make at least a show of sacrificing Venice, who obstinately refused to give up Vicenza and Verona. The new league of Pope and Emperor, compacted in November, 1512, was bound to suggest the reconciliation of Venice and France, and before the year was out overtures were made, which in March, 1513, led to a renewal of the Franco-Venetian league. On the other hand, the question of Ferrara was not decided, and imperial rights conflicted with papal pretensions in Parma and Piacenza, Modena and Reggio. The advance of the Spanish army into Lombardy, and its occupation of Brescia, threatened Italian freedom in every direction. The Swiss had been called into Milan as deliverers; they remained as masters. These problems were bequeathed by Julius to his successor, Giovanni de' Medici (Leo X).

French prestige was low in 1513. Henry VIII routed the famous French cavalry at Guinegaste and captured Terouanne. The Swiss invaded Burgundy with imperial aid, and la Tremouille was forced to ransom the province and its capital, by the promise to surrender Milan and pay 400,000 crowns. The refusal of Louis to ratify this bargain hardly improved the situation. But towards the end of the year he recovered the papal friendship by recognising the Lateran Council, and abandoning the schismatic cardinals. The remainder of his reign, until his death in January, 1515, was spent in preparations, military and diplomatic, for the recovery of his lost position in Europe. Various marriage arrangements were mooted, of which only one came into effect, the third marriage of Louis, with Mary the sister of Henry VIII. The alliance with Venice was maintained; with the rest of the European powers a relation ensued of precarious hostility, tempered by more or less insincere offers of friendship.

Thus the accession of Francis of Angouleme found France prepared for war, and secured at least on the side of England. The gallant young King was eager for the paths of glory. His enemies made ready to receive him,-Ferdinand, the Swiss, and Maximilian with unequivocal hostility, the Pope prepared to accept a profitable compromise. But Francis could not pay Leo's price, which was nothing less than Naples for Giuliano de' Medici. Thus of the Italian powers Venice alone stood on his side.

The lack of Swiss foot-soldiers was supplied partly by German levies, partly by recruits raised by Pedro Navarra, who had entered French service, on the frontiers of France and Spain. The ordonnances were raised to 4,000 lances. Genoa was ready to join the French, and the Swiss, alarmed by rumours, sent a considerable reinforcement into Milan, which was employed to occupy Susa and the Alpine passes. In June and July a further and larger contingent entered the Milanese. Lack of pay and provision soon made itself felt, to the damage of discipline and goodwill. However the promise of papal and Florentine help eased the situation.

Here disunion and divergent counsels led to further undecided and unconcerted movements and left the way open to the French, who only at Novara met some slight resistance. But reinforcements came across the Alps ; and at the beginning of September considerable bodies of Swiss lay at Domo d1 Ossola, Varese, and Monza, unable to agree on any plan for joint action or even for concentration. Meanwhile negotiations were in progress at Gallerate, the French showing themselves ready to make considerable money grants, and offering Sforza compensation in France. On the 9th of September an agreement was actually sealed. Foremost among the peace party were the towns of Bern, Freiburg, and Solothurn. But the army, now at length partly concentrated at Monza, was ill-satisfied with the terms, and especially the men of Uri, Schwyzt and Glarus. These determined to reject the treaty and move on Milan,, where the party favourable to France had recently been overthrown.

At this moment the distribution of the various forces was as follows. The French lay at Binasco, the Swiss at Monza; Alviano near Cremona ; Cardona with the Spanish, and Lorenzo de1 Medici with the papal army, near Piacenza. Cardona and Lorenzo with good reason mistrusted each other, and were mistrusted by the Swiss. But the latter were at length determined by the influence of Schinner to reject all overtures for peace, and advance against the enemy. On the 10th of September the Swiss army was in Milan. Meanwhile the French army had moved to a position S.S.E. of Milan near Marignano', in order to be in easier touch with Alviano, who had occupied Lodi.

The success of Francis was complete. Cardona withdrew to Naples. The Pope began to treat. The Swiss, though the Forest Cantons were opposed to peace, were sick of a league which had left all the hard work to them and did not even supply the sinews of war. Sforza surrendered the castles of Milan and Cremona and became a pensioner of France. In December the Pope and King met in Bologna, and conditions were arranged which restored peace between the Holy See and the Most Christian King. But the claims of Venice still presented difficulties, and Maximilian could not acquiesce in the occupation of Milan. The Swiss League was seriously divided. Eight cantons were ready for a peace, even for a league with France, but five were eager to renew the struggle. With the aid of these latter Maximilian invaded Milan in March, 1516; but the Swiss were unwilling to fight against their countrymen in French service, and finally the imperial host broke up. In November the whole Swiss League concluded an everlasting peace with Francis. Early in the same year Ferdinand had died, and his successor, Charles, was not for the present ready to take up his heritage of hostility to France. So at Noyon it was arranged between Charles and Francis to dispose of Naples by way of marriage (August, 1516); and at length, in December, the Emperor made terms at Brussels, which closed the war of Cambray by a precarious truce. Soon after Verona was restored to Venice, who had in the interval conquered Brescia.

Here we may halt, while war is hushed awhile, to glance at the results of all these years of strife. France is established temporarily in Milan, Spain more lastingly in Naples. The extent of the papal possessions has been increased, and the papal rule therein has been made firmer and more direct. A close alliance between the Papacy and the interests of the Medici family has been established. Venice has recovered all her territory, though the sacrifices of the war and the shifting of trade-routes will prevent her from ever rising again to her former pride of place. The short-lived appearance of the Swiss among the great and independent powers of Europe is at an end. The international forces of the West have assumed the forms and the proportions that they are to retain for many years to come.

Though almost every province of Italy has been devastated in its turn, though many flourishing cities have been sacked, and the wealth of all has been drained by hostile or protecting armies, literature, learning, and art do not appear at first to feel the blight. The age of the war of Cambray is also the age of Bramante, Michel Angelo, and RafFaelle. Julius II is not only the scourge of Italy, but the patron of art. The greatest or at least the most magnificent age of Venetian art is the age of her political and commercial declension. The vigorous vitality that had been fostered in half a century of comparative peace served to sustain the Renaissance movement through many years of war and waste. Peace multiplies wealth, and art is the fosterchild of wealth; but wealth is not its true parent. No statistician's curve can render visible the many causes of the rise and fall of art. The definite decline, which is perceptible after the sack of Rome, may be due in part to economic changes, and those to the influence of war, but its fundamental causes are spiritual and moral, and elude all material estimation.

As a chapter in military history the period is full of interest. The individual heroism of panoplied knights still plays its part amid the shock of disciplined armies at Novara or at Marignano. Yet in all the battles and campaigns we see the tactics and strategy of infantry working towards a higher evolution, in which Swiss and German and Spaniard each bears his part. Hand fire-arms, though constantly employed, seldom appear to influence results. On the other hand at Ravenna the skilful use of artillery determined for the first time the issue of an important battle. And the art of military engineers, especially that of mining, shows considerable advance.

War plays its part in promoting the intercourse of nations and in spreading the arts of peace. Captive Italy made her domination felt, not only in France, but also in Germany and Spain. But apart from this meagre and indirect result we look in vain for any of the higher motives or tendencies that sometimes direct the course of armies and the movement of nations. Greed, ambition, the lust of battle, the interests of dynasties, such are the forces that seem to rule the fate of Italy and Europe. Yet amidst this chaos of blind and soulless strife the scheme and equilibrium of the western world is gradually taking shape.