WALLENSTEIN AND BERNARD OF WEIMAR. (1632-5.)
1. WALLENSTEIN'S END. (1632-4.)
By Dr A. W. WARD.
Movements of the armies after Lützen . 223
Oxenstierna's position after the death of Gustavus . 224
Military dispositions. Alliance of Heilbroun . 225
Richelieu and Oxenstierna . 226
Horn and Bernard of Weimar .227
Outbreak of discontent in the Swedish army . 228
Bernard Duke of Franconia. 229
The army "contented." Swedish advances. 230
Arrival of Feria. Fall of Ratisbon . 231
Wallenstein in Bohemia . 232
Wallenstein and the Bohemians .233
Wallenstein's negotiations with the Bohemians . 234
His negotiations with Arnim. Death of Hoik . 235
Arnim's Silesian scheme. Wallenstein draws back . 236
Wallenstein advances, and returns into Bohemia . 237
Agitation against Wallenstem .238
Wallenstein and his oificers . 239
The removal of Wallenstein determined . 240
Deposing order. Resolution of officers . 241
Defection of the army. Wallenstein murdered at Eger .242
Wallenstein's chief purpose . 243
2. NÖRDLINGEN AND PRAGUE. (1634-5.)
Bernard of Weimar . 243
Advance of King Ferdinand. Ratisbon recovered . 244
Battle of Nördlingen . 245
Breakdown of the Heilbronn Alliance . 246
The Frankfort Convention and the Paris Treaty. 247
The Palatinate. Franco-Swedish Treaty at Paris . 248
The Worms Convention . 249
Grotius at Paris. Capture of Philippsburg . 250
Treaty of Compiègne . 251
Negotiations for peace with the Emperor . 252
Peace of Prague . 253
The Peace of Prague widely accepted . 254
Saxon and Swedish policy . 255
WALLENSTEIN AND BERNARD OF WEIMAR.
1. WALLENSTEIN'S END. (1632-4.)
DURING the winter months which followed on the battle of Lützen neither of the hosts which contended for victory there maintained possession of Saxony or engaged in important operations beyond its borders. While Wallenstein, after evacuating the electorate, set up his winter quarters at Prague, and there collected the forces with which in May he joined Gallas in Silesia, the Swedish army broke up again into several divisions. That commanded by Bernard of Weimar, after clearing Saxony of Hoik's and other Imperialist soldiery, passed into Thuringia and Franconia. In March Bernard pushed forward as far as the river Altmühl in the Ansbach territory, and, after a brush with the redoubtable Bavarian cavalry general, Johann von Werth, united his forces south of Donauwörth with those of Horn, who had in the last month of 1632 conquered nearly the whole of Elsass.
The expectant character of these movements on the one and the other side is explained by the fact that Lützen had virtually been a drawn battle. But in the summer of 1633 they came more or less to a standstill-Wallenstein's by his own calculated inaction, Bernard of Weimar's because of an agitation (it can hardly be called a mutiny) in the Swedish army, which was only with some difficulty repressed. Broadly speaking, we may regard this standstill as reflecting the doubts and difficulties which, after the death of the great King, pressed upon some of the chief combatants.
The Swedes, though resolved not to break off except on their own terms the struggle of which their King had, first and last, so clearly defined the ends, could no longer exercise over its progress the controlling influence proper to his mighty personality. Gustavus Adolphus was succeeded on the Swedish throne by his daughter Christina, a child of six years of age ; and, so long as she remained in tutelage, the government, as will be shown in a later chapter, was practically carried on by a small committee directed by the strong will of the Chancellor, Axel
Oxenstierna. The widow of Gustavus, Maria Eleonora of Brandenburg, was not included among the regents and guardians. Although the system of government during the minority of the " Elected " Queen-a designation partly intended to repress any pretensions on the part of the Polish Vasas-was not approved by the Swedish Diet till January, 1634, Oxenstierna secured a twelvemonth earlier the confirmation of his commission as "Legate" of the Crown, with full powers in the Holy Roman Empire and as regarding all Swedish armies. Thus there was preserved to these armies in Germany that unity of control which had given them so inestimable an advantage over their adversaries, and to which it had been the constant purpose of Gustavus to subject the military affairs of his German allies. To his position of trust, for which it might be difficult to find a parallel, Oxenstierna brought, besides a perfect knowledge of his late master's mind, the insight and judgment of a great statesman. He proved, indeed, unable to solve the perennial problem of a working control of the military executive by the civil authority. Beneath his methodical ways and a phlegmatic temperament that provoked the wit of the young Queen, there burnt a flame of patriotic ambition and incorruptible loyalty, to which a series of eminent commanders proved responsive ; but the union of military and political leadership, and the enthusiasm which the great King's personality had communicated to the Swedish armies and nation, had perforce become things of the past.
Though the relaxation of the bond between the Swedes and the chief Protestant Princes was in agreement with the usual policy of John George of Saxony, a warlike impulse had momentarily seized upon him, due, it would seem, to a visionary scheme of securing the Bohemian Crown to his son and namesake. The unlucky Frederick, who had so long worn the empty title of King of Bohemia, had died at Mainz on November 29, 1632, still awaiting-though with drooping hopes-his restoration to his Palatine inheritance, now, with the exception of Heidelberg, reconquered from the foe. But neither Oxenstierna, who had arrived in Dresden on Christmas Day, nor the military chiefs of the Swedish armies, fell in with John George's design. He was all the more unwilling to yield to the Chancellor's demand that the entire body of Protestant Estates should be placed under the direction of Sweden, and adhered to his view that Saxony was their proper head. At Berlin, whither Oxenstierna next repaired, he found George William in a more yielding mood ; he was well aware at whose expense Sweden would in any treaty of peace seek to obtain her "satisfaction," and was naturally anxious to conciliate the Chancellor. The project of a marriage between George William's heir (afterwards the Great Elector) and Queen Christina had not yet been laid aside. But soon after this George William showed signs of falling back into line with Saxony, and committed the command of his troops in Silesia, where old Count Thurn
In January, 1633, Oxenstierna had divided the main Swedish army, giving the command of the larger half to Duke George of Luneburg, who, with Kniphausen under him, occupied the Weser lands, and that of the smaller to Bernard of Weimar, to the dissatisfaction of his elder brother, Duke William. Oxenstierna was well aware of the difficulty which must beset any attempt to secure the adhesion of the Protestant Estates at large to an alliance directed by Sweden, against the wishes of Saxony, so long as Brandenburg remained lukewarm and most of the Lower Saxon Estates only wished for a safe neutrality. Sweden's one trustworthy friend was Landgrave William of Hesse-Cassel ; and his troops were needed for the defence of his own territory. Perceiving that in the present instance the half was greater than the whole, Oxenstierna therefore fell back upon those portions of the Empire-the Franconian, the Swabian, and the two Rhenish Circles-which had been placed under his direct control by King Gustavus. United with these Estates by means of a separate alliance under her own direction, Sweden must endeavour to carry on the war side by side with another combination of Estates under Saxon leadership ; and perhaps in time the weaker might be absorbed by the stronger body.
The alliance concluded at Heilbronn (Ulm having seemed too remote a place of meeting) on April 23, 1633, was accordingly one of those compromises which deserve to be regarded as great political achievements because they avert paralysis. In order to reach a conclusion, Oxenstierna consented to important sacrifices ; and, though Sweden obtained the direction of the alliance, especially in military aftairs, a Federal Council was established, of which seven members were to be nominated by the Estates of the four Circles, and only three by Sweden, The functions of this Council were to be consultative rather than executive ; but it was likely to find many opportunities for interference. These chances were not ignored by Richelieu, who, desirous as he was of securing the continuance of hostilities between Sweden and the House of Austria, jealously watched Sweden's intervention in what he regarded as the French sphere of influence on the Rhine. While, therefore, the conclusion of the Heilbronn Alliance was furthered by the French ambassador at the Convention, Manasses de Pas, Marquis de Feuquières, who had in 1633 been sent on an extraordinary mission to the Emperor and the Catholic and Protestant Estates of the Empire, his efforts were also directed to the diminution within that alliance of the dominant influence of Sweden. For the rest, the annual war contributions of the four
Oxenstierna's rapid conclusion of the Heilbronn Alliance, however much it left to be desired from the Swedish point of view, had successfully isolated the Elector of Saxony, especially after the Elector of Brandenburg had come into the new league. But the Chancellor could not shut his eyes to the fact that his achievement was quite as advantageous to France as it was to Sweden. Richelieu, for reasons explained elsewhere, and because he wished to prepare his ground before proceeding to action, continued to defer any direct French intervention in the German War. In 1631, the Peace of Cherasco, which secured an open way into Italy for France, had enabled him to devote a closer attention to her relations with the Empire. Its rights or claims over Lorraine he treated with contempt; but when, in obliging Duke Charles to conclude the disastrous and humiliating Treaty of Liverdun (June, 1632), Richelieu imposed upon him as one of its conditions neutrality during the continuance of the German War, he saw that the course of that war would furnish him with opportunities of mixing up the question of Lorraine with that of Elsass, now almost entirely in Swedish hands ; and he was therefore most desirous that the war should continue. His action towards the Spiritual Electors on the left bank of the Rhine has already been noted in a previous chapter. On the approach of Gustavus, and the occupation of Mainz, the Electors of Cologne and Trier had appealed to France for the protection of their neutrality ; and, though this appeal had remained unanswered, the quickwitted Philip Christopher of Trier had admitted French garrisons both into the fortress of Ehrenbreitstein opposite his residence of Coblenz, and into Trier itself, previously occupied by Spanish troops. The footing thus gained by France she was unlikely to relinquish to either friend or foe. Thus, after the death of Gustavus, Richelieu's most pressing interest was to keep together the offensive alliance against the House of Austria, now once more in close cooperation with Spain, and to preclude the possibility of the withdrawal of the Swedish army, which had been actually threatened by Oxenstierna. On the other hand, Richelieu was ready to take immediate advantage of the removal of Gustavus himself, before whose commanding personality his own indomitable will had found itself obliged to bend. Hence the twofold activity of Feuquières at Heilbronn in favour of the compact concluded there; while at the same time the hands of Oxenstierna were bound as far AS possible by a renewal of the Franco-Swedish alliance, on terms essentially the same as those of the Treaty of Bärwalde, and renewing the promise of a French subsidy (April 19, 1633).
Inasmuch as the Heilbronn Alliance placed all the military forces of the west under Swedish control, it was upon the commanders of those forces that the mantle of the conquering Gustavus may be said to have fallen. After their junction near Donauwörth (April, 1638), Horn and Bernard of Weimar alternately held the chief command, neither of them consenting to regard himself as the subordinate of the qther, and Oxenstierna being desirous of offending neither. Though both had high qualities as commanders, the want of unity in their counsels made itself at times disadvantageous^ felt in the course of the next campaigns. Gustaf Karlsson Horn, Count of Björneborg, who sprang from a family of high distinction in the Swedish service, had, after taking a prominent part in the Polish War, during Gustavus' German campaigns held the position of the King's Field-Marshal (lieutenant-general). He had materially contributed to the victory of Breitenfeld, and had subsequently been named "Director of the Würzburg principality." He was a commander of much circumspection, learned in the theory' as well as experienced in the practice of war, and a strict disciplinarian. Within the last months of 1632 he had conquered the whole of Elsass, with the exception of Hagenau. In the personality of Bernard of Weimar there was something which more nearly resembled that of the great King, whose last battle he had fought to a conclusion. From his Ernestine ancestors he had inherited a passionate disposition- which in one of his brothers, the unhappy John Frederick, swerved into madness, but in Bernard was disciplined into a noble ardour. His own statement, that from his youth upwards his thoughts had been bent upon doing service to God and his beloved country, was no mere profession. His intellectual tastes (he was a lover of books) and his modest simplicity invested him with a chivalrous charm ; in the field he was all eagerness for battle. Unfortunately for himself, he was, like Duke George of Luneburg, who commanded in the Lower Saxon Circle and its vicinity, only a younger brother in a princely House-a position which, while it aroused in him a strong dynastic ambition, left him unable to meet on an independent footing the great Powers whose support was indispensable to the cause of Protestantism and of "German liberty."
Once more, then, the Swedish army stood at the gate of Bavaria ; and once more Maximilian was soliciting the aid of Wallenstein, who remained immovable in Bohemia. The Swedish forces seem to have numbered about 18,000 men ; and if, as Bernard expected, Wallenstein marched to offer them battle, he could not be met without Saxon assistance. But before long a new difficulty arose, the inner history of which remains to some extent obscure.
Since the Swedish army had landed at Usedom, it had changed in its composition, and to some extent in its character. Losses, made good by reinforcements of which only a fraction was derived from
Sweden, while they mainly consisted of soldiery levied near and far, and in all the regions of the Empire through which the troops had passed during their ceaseless marches and counter-marches, had changed the very texture of the army. The disproportion between Swedes and soldiers of other nationalities was much greater than before, more «specially in the divisions detached from the force commanded by the King in person. As has been already seen, the principle of making war pay for itself had been more and more fully adopted by Gustavus. But even during his lifetime, notwithstanding the heavy contributions exacted and requisitions made, and (when they had been received) the French subsidies, it had been found impossible to provide the full pay of the soldiery, especially in the detached divisions. The King had thus fallen into debt with his troops, but more especially with the colonels who commanded, and had frequently themselves levied, regiments, advancing sums for their pay in the expectation of being duly repaid with interest. Here and there in the conquered territories, especially in Franconia, some of the officers had been compensated by the grant or promise of landed estates. For many reasons, the death of the King inevitably impaired the cohesion and the general discipline of the army. During the winter of 1632-3, the commanding officers took to levying contributions on their own account, while the soldiers seized the goods and chattels of the inhabitants, and committed all kinds of depredations and other excesses. The general discontent grew apace; and, when it was found that the Convention of Heilbronn, on which great hopes had been placed, was more anxious for the " reformation " of the army than for its " contentment," the accumulated dissatisfaction burst forth. A remonstrance was drawn up by two officers of the Franconian army- one of them the Colonel Mitzlaff who had commanded the remnants of Mansfeld's troops in Silesia and had then passed first into the Danish, and then into the Swedish, service. Quite in the style of the English " agitators "• of a rather later date, this document insisted on the payment within four months of the outstanding balances ; failing which, instead of continuing to fight the enemy, the officers and troops would establish themselves as a corpus in the conquered lands, and hold these in pledge for their pay. The paper was numerously signed by the officers \ but there is no trace of an organised mutiny among the common soldiery. The attitude of Horn and Bernard of Weimar toward this agitation is obscure. While they protested against the menaces of the officers, they were found willing to advocate the claims preferred ; and, while Horn insisted on carrying the remonstrance in its crude and unamended form to Heilbronnj Bernard, who was certainly to benefit by the movement, and who may (as Pufendorf hints) have helped to set it on foot; wrote in support of the demands. Oxenstiernä in his turn was so much impressed by the gravity of the situation that he persuaded the Estates at Heilbronn, before separating, to agree to the principle of a month's-
On these lines the grievances of the army were settled in the course of the summer and autumn of 1633. Bernard, who during Horn's absence had employed the troops in seizing the bishopric of Eichstedt, which they were freely allowed to loot, in May held an interview with Oxenstierna at Frankfort to arrange his share-the lion's share:-of the settlement. About the middle of June the document was signed in which the Crown of Sweden, by its own authority and without the concurrence of any of the Estates of the Empire, created Bernard Duke of Franconia in his own right.
Bernard, who had hitherto held no independent position of his own, had long desired a hereditary principality; and some promise of the kind may have been made to him by Gustavus Adolphus. His further wish to become, not only, as he now did, a member of ,the Heilbronn Alliance, but also the commander-in-chief of its forces, was frustrated by the jealousy of Horn, and perhaps also by the foresight of Oxenstierna. The new duchy of Franconia included, in substance, only those parts of the Franconian Circle which had formed the sees of Würzburg and Baraberg; and even here the Crown of Sweden reserved to itself the fortresses of Würzburg and Königshofen. Bernard was not declared an immediate Prince of the Empire-the comparison between his dukedom and Wallenstein's in Mecklenburg is therefore imperfect ; on the contrary, he had to renounce all connexion with the Empire and declare himself explicitly a vassal of the Crown of Sweden, to whom in the event of his dying without male issue the duchy was to escheat.
In this new character Bernard, with Oxenstierna, made his appearance at an assembly of the chief princes of the Heilbronn Alliance, held later in June, 1633, at Heidelberg. The capital of the Palatinate, the last place in it held by the Imperialists, had on May 24 capitulated to Count Palatine Christian of Birkenfeld, The assembly agreed to levy in all the lands included in the alliance a 10 per cent, tax on the produce of all fields and vineyards; and, the means being thus provided, a settlement was arranged here and completed at Frankfort (July), which at last put an end to the critical condition of affairs in the army.
Bernard's absence from the army was prolonged during July, while he was taking possession of his new duchy and establishing his brother Ernest there as regent. In the meantime Horn held the command without making much progress, though in the course of the month he took Pappenheim, and then Neumarkt (near Landshut), having advanced from Donauwörth with his main force. He was beginning to lose all control over his troops ; villages were destroyed ; the peasantry was maltreated. The officers neglected their soldiery ; and the men,
The army having thus been " contented," and measures taken to prevent further excesses (August-September), it once more became possible to contemplate offensive operations on a larger scale. Although the division of the supreme command boded ill for the maintenance of the requisite unity of design, the general condition of affairs was favourable to the allies of Heilbronn. Elsass had been almost entirely conquered by Horn. In August Christian of Birkenfeld defeated the Duke of Lorraine at Pfaffenhofen when advancing to defend Hagenau in Elsass, over which he had certain rights. The favourable opportunity for reopening hostilities against Lorraine was at once seized by France, under whose protection the Elector of Trier had now openly placed himself. Frederick Henry of Orange had taken Rheinberg; and in Switzerland also French influence was active. The whole line of the Rhine was thus held by the United Provinces, France, and Sweden ; and the alliance between the latter two Powers was nearer than ever to becoming an alliance in the field.
While the Austrian possessions in Elsass were thus in hostile hands, Spain too had every reason for breaking the existing control of the line of the Rhine. The peace negotiations opened in 1632 between her and the United Provinces had led to no result; and, as the days of the Infanta Isabel Clara Eugenia drew to a close, the hopes of a pacific settlement dwindled. Philip IV had some time since resolved on sending his youngest brother Ferdinand, who, though Archbishop of Toledo and a Cardinal, was full of secular ambition, into the Spanish Netherlands, where he was in time to succeed the Archduchess as Governor. As the Dutch were masters of the sea, the Cardinal Infante would, when the time came, have to proceed to the Provinces by land ;
In the middle of September Feria actually appeared at Innsbruck, though with a force of only 8000 foot and 1200 horse, and not in very good case. But he managed to effect his junction with Aldringer and to relieve Constance and Breisach, before Horn and Bernard had united their forces. In October the two armies lay close to each other, near the Lake of Constance, neither side caring to risk a battle, when, direct hostilities having at last broken out between Wallenstein's troops and Arnim's Saxo-Swedish forces in Silesia, Oxenstierna instructed Bernard to create a diversion in their favour by invading either Bavaria or Bohemia, and leaving Horn to deal with Feria and Aldringer. Bernard could thus at last carry out his long-cherished design against Ratisbon.
Disregarding the successful operations of Johann von Werth and the insecure condition of his own duchy of Franconia, Bernard with characteristic impetuosity now moved direct upon his goal. Starting with ten thousand men from Donauwörth, he executed a rapid march between the Scylla of Ingolstadt and the Charybdis of Eichstedt to the Altmuhl, and thence direct upon Ratisbon. In vain at the last moment Maximilian applied for aid to Feria and Aldringer-they were too far away; to Gallas, who had succeeded Hoik, and whom Wallenstein would not allow to move from the Bohemian frontier ; and to Wallenstein himself, who had no intention of coming to the Elector's aid. Ratisbon was garrisoned by two thousand Bavarian troops under Colonel Troibreze; but notwithstanding a powerful and active Catholic clergy, the sympathies of the majority of the citizens, and of a minority of the town council, were Protestant, and with Maximilian the city had a long-standing quarrel. Ratisbon, which lay on the right bank of the Danube, was completely blocked by Bernard ; Johann von Werth's horse were kept at a distance; and the bombardment, begun on November 10, 1633, having after two days' intermission been resumed with great vigour on the 13th, the garrison capitulated on the following day. It was allowed free departure with the honours of war ; but the majority of the garrison proposed to come over to Bernard. Hereupon, he held his entry into Ratisbon, amidst the rejoicings of the population ; and on November 16, the anniversary of the battle of Liitzen, a solemn Protestant service was held in
Ratisbon, then, had not been relieved by Wallenstein ; and no coals of fire had been heaped by him on the head of Maximilian of Bavaria for the action of the Diet held in that city three years before. How is the quiescence of Wallenstein-if quiescence it was-during the twelvemonths which had elapsed since the battle of Lützen to be explained ?
For him, too, the situation had been changed by that battle and the death of Gustavus Adolphus. Hitherto he had committed no disloyal act, and had in all probability entertained no definitely disloyal intentions. His general scheme of policy had been to aid the Emperor in restoring the Imperial authority and in bringing about a settlement which, while leaving that authority unimpaired, should be acceptable to the Protestant Princes and include conditions favourable to his personal interests. No side, however, trusted him, because he was identified with no party or interest, because he was at any time ready to exchange combination for combination, and because, as his occasional abrupt and passionate utterances indicate, the outlines of his successive schemes were apt to lose themselves in the mists of a vague and boundless ambition. His withdrawal into Bohemia after the battle of Lützen was hardly reconcilable with his official announcement of a complete Imperialist victory, and his prestige as a general suffered in consequence ; indeed there was some gossip among the courtiers at Vienna as to his being superseded in the command. Fortunately for him, Bernard of Weimar had declined to follow the Imperialist army, still numerically the stronger, into Bohemia.-
Thus Wallenstein had time for augmenting his army at Prague and restoring its efficiency. In the campaigns of 1688 he seems to have intended to play a vigorous part, both by putting an end to the alliance between Saxony and Sweden, and by saving Breisach and if possible recovering the Austrian lands in Elsass-a task which he had no intention of leaving the Spaniards to accomplish. Franconia and Bavaria, as well as the Weser lands, he proposed to leave more or less to themselves. Still, being unable to place in the field an army so preponderant in strength as to ensure success, and habitually preferring diplomatic to military measures in the first instance, he continued to
Wallenstein, however wide the range of his statesmanship, was at all times sensible of the ties of nationality, family history, the associations of descent and early life. He was born a Bohemian noble and bred a utraquist. The leaders of the Bohemian insurrection, who after the catastrophe of the White Hill had become exiles from their country, had never abandoned the hope of re-establishing the ancient Bohemian constitution in Church and State under an elected King of their own choice. As the star of this or that Protestant leader had been in the ascendant, his possible claims had been considered-Bethlen Gabor was thought of at one time, and even Mansfeld at another. Wallen-stein's position differed widely from theirs; but he was a Bohemian magnate, and of Catholic intolerance at least there had never been any trace in his conduct. This had not been overlooked by the Swedes in their negotiations with Wallenstein both before and after the death of Gustavus Adolphus. The Swedish troops in Silesia were in the main officered by Bohemian Protestant exiles, with Count Thurn at their head as royal commissary ; and Bohemian agents in plenty were at hand to take part in secret negotiations, from Major-General Bubna to Sezyma Rasin, who in the end turned Crown witness against Wallenstein and contributed more than any man to make the record of his last years a perplexing tangle of truth and fiction. Of a different type was Count William Kinsky, a Bohemian noble who had contrived to preserve his ample estates from confiscation, but was obliged to reside at Dresden, the ordinary place of refuge for his exiled compatriots. He was
By the middle of May, and probably earlier, the Bohemian malcontents were in communication with Nicolai, the Swedish resident at Dresden, as to the revived project of placing Wallenstein on the Bohemian throne ; which, on being reported to Oxenstierna, received his general approval. Hereupon Kinsky furnished Nicolai with a list of the commanders fully trusted by Wallenstein. Whether or not this list, in which both Hoik and Gallas figured, had been obtained at first hand, Wallenstein about this time actually had an interview with Bubna at Gitschin. It seems certain that Wallenstein here made no declaration as to his intentions with regard to the Bohemian Crown, and that his present object was to become enabled by a junction between Thurn's army and his own to dictate peace. There was as yet no question of his abandoning the Emperor, but he obviously meant to leave both Saxony and Bavaria out in the cold. Oxenstierna, though he had no intention of binding himself, was prepared to carry on negotiations, like Gustavus Adolphus before him, in furtherance of the Bohemian project.
But in the meantime matters had assumed a different aspect in Silesia. Here, with the opening of the summer of 1633, some military action had become unavoidable ; and in May Wallenstein began operations against the combined army of Saxons, Brandenburgers, and Swedes. Their commander, Arnim, had, as has been seen, always advocated an accommodation with the Emperor, and was practically the head of the peace party at the Saxon Court. But Wallenstein had a special reason for desiring not to prolong the campaign which he had just begun. Official news had reached him from Vienna that Feria, instead of merely passing through the western borderlands of the Empire, was to be instructed to operate there against the French, and that Aldringer was to be placed under his supreme command. Thus, not only was Spain to control Elsass, but Wallenstein's own position as generalissimo of all Imperialist and Spanish troops in the Empire was to be impaired.
Early in June, when a decisive battle was supposed to be imminent between Wallenstein and Arnim, a fortnight's truce was agreed upon between them, to the bitter disappointment of the Bohemians. Feuquières, who had been intriguing to secure the Saxon army for France, began to fear that Wallenstein intended to attack Bavaria; and Richelieu as well as Oxenstierna came to the conclusion that any agreement with Wallenstein must be conditional upon his open abandonment of the Emperor. But, although in the concessions which he
When, after the truce had come to an end, Wallenstein, notwithstanding his superiority in numbers, went on negotiating with Arnim (July), the Court of Vienna no longer heeded protests made by him against Feria's march. If, therefore, Wallenstein still meant to impose a pacific settlement at the head of an overpowering military force he had no time to lose. Hoik's renewed raid into the Voigtland (the south-western part of the Saxon Electorate), which was even more savage than the first, and in the course of which he contrived to frighten the Leipzigers out of their wits, seems to have been intended by his chief to prevent a Saxon invasion of Bohemia ; and it was only his fear of Bernard of Weimar's marching against him at the Elector of Saxony's request that caused Hoik to withdraw his army, which was suffering terribly from the plague. On his way back to Bohemia, Hoik, who had not yet completed his fortieth year, fell a victim to the disease at Adorf (September 19) ; and the most faithful of Wallenstein's lieutenants was inopportunely lost to the commander-in-chief, to whom in his own phrase he " belonged." His place was ill supplied by Gallas.
On September 19 Arnim, as to the course of whose latest negotiations with Wallenstein nothing is known, reached Gelnhausen (near Hanau), whither Oxenstierna had come from Frankfort to meet him. Arnim's account to the Swedish Chancellor of Wallenstein's view of the situation was that the Emperor had always aimed at a separate peace with Saxony and her German allies, but this Sweden could not allow Saxony to accept. On the other hand Wallenstein himself would not submit to a repetition, with Spanish aid, of the Ratisbon proceedings of 1680. He was not quite sure of all his officers, but had already removed some whom he could not trust. If Sweden would support him he would break with the Emperor, lead his army, after uniting it to the Swedish force, from Silesia into Bohemia, and invade Austria. France (with whose ambassador Arnim avoided contact at Gelnhausen) was to be induced by Sweden to resume the offensive against Spain in Italy.
Although the complement and crown of these vast designs, the accession of Wallenstein to the Bohemian throne, remained as yet unmentioned, they suggest the inspiration of Thurn and his Bohemian
Amim having refused Wallenstein's demand that the Saxons should march with him to the Rhine-a movement which in any case would hardly have been executed so late in the year-negotiations between them were entirely broken off. But Wallenstein seems still to have cherished hopes of bringing about a peace with Saxony and Brandenburg
The effect of these successes was undoubtedly great; once more it seemed as if Wallenstein were about to become the arbiter of northern Germany, and as if his desire of bringing about an equitable political and religious peace for the Empire at large were after all to be realised. Victory was the best assurance of the fidelity of his army ; and, with this assured, his dictatorship must become irresistible. But at this point, when it was too late to save Ratisbon from the approach of Bernard of Weimar, the Emperor joined in solicitations with Maximilian of Bavaria, and Wallenstein gave way. Leaving Gallas with 4000 men at Leitmeritz, he started on November 18 with the bulk of his army to meet Bernard of Weimar, whose advance upon Ratisbon he had insisted upon disbelieving. Undeceived by the news of its fall, he hoped for a moment either to retake it, or, by intercepting Bernard's march along the line of the Danube upon Passau, to prevent him from invading Upper Austria and even menacing Vienna. Ordering Baron de Suys to post himself with a couple of regiments in Upper Austria, Wallenstein directed his own march upon the Upper Palatinate, where he halted at Fiirth, in an angle between the Bohemian and Bavarian frontiers, in order to take Cham, about ten miles further south, where lay a small Swedish garrison (end of November).
Bernard of Weimar, delighted to have drawn Wallenstein at last, and believing that Gallas with his whole division had reinforced the garrison of Passau, was retracing his steps in order to relieve Cham, when the astounding news reached him that Wallenstein had given up the investment of Cham and led his army back into Bohemia. The immediate reason for this movement, one of the most perplexing of all the shifts and turns in Wallenstein's career, seems to have been that, with Arnim advancing on the Oder and the Swedish Marshal Kniphausen advancing from the Weser, he feared for his own rear ; moreover, the season was certainly far advanced.
At Vienna the indignation aroused against Wallenstein by his retreat had passed all bounds. The partisans of Bavaria and Spain were up in arms against him and his decision to let his army winter in the Emperor's own lands, instead of in Franconia and Thuringia. Even Eggenberg, hitherto Wallenstein's best friend at Court, declared : " Amicus Socrates ; arnicas Plato ; amicior autem religio et patria,"" The Emperor himself, complaining that he seemed to have another sovereign by his side, issued an order, bidding Wallenstein return at once into Bavaria, and refused point-blank his request that the defence of the electorate should be committed to Aldringer with part of Feria's troops. At the same time Suys was instructed to move back towards the Inn. Finally, two Imperial councillors, Trautmansdorff and Questenberg, were sent to Wallenstein in his camp at Pilsen, to impress upon him the Emperor's " categorical commands."
Wallenstein could not but recognise that a crisis had been reached in his relations with the Emperor and the Imperial Government. With Count Schlick, the President of the Hqfkriegsrath, he had for some time been on unfriendly terms ; and he had another influential adversary in Baron von Stadion, the Grand Master of the German Order. Together with Eggenberg, Bishop Anton of Vienna was passing into the ranks of his opponents, who continued to be urged on by the Jesuits, and in particular by the Emperor's Walloon confessor, Father Lamormain. Maximilian of Bavaria was well served by his ambassador Richel, whose correspondence with his master supplies much information as to the course of things at Vienna. All these agencies, as Wallenstein knew, were at work to break down his absolute authority as commander-in-chief, on which the whole strength of his position and political influence depended. But most formidable of all was the influence of Spain, represented at Vienna by Castaneda, and from October, 1633, also by Onate, whose efforts were systematically directed towards bringing about a joint action between the two Habsburg Courts not less intimate, and more effective, than that which he had negotiated at the beginning of the war. The circumstances of the times were propitious ; for an heir had recently (September 8) been born to the young King Ferdinand of
Hungary and his Spanish consort Maria Anna, and the dynastic interests of the two lines seemed more closely blended than ever. But Wallenstein had persistently withstood the proposal of levying an army in the Empire to fight on the Rhine under Spanish direction ; and he would not even listen to the young King's wish to hold a command in the Imperial forces. The policy of Spain ran directly counter to Wallenstein's ; while the latter aimed at an equitable peace in the Empire, the former was wholly directed to uniting Austria with Spain in the war against France. The commander in such a war could not be Wallenstein, who was, among many other things, accused of having entered into treasonable correspondence with Richelieu. The Bavarian ambassador had already suggested to the Emperor that the obnoxious general should be removed from the supreme command. Onate now threatened that unless this were done the Spanish subsidies would be stopped-and at the same time, no doubt, the private pensions paid under Olivares' reckless system of expenditure, not only to the King of Hungary, who was wholly in the Spanish interest, but also to other personages of note. Before the close of the year the Emperor sent secret communications to Gallas, Aldringer, and some of the commanders in Moravia; but the purport of these remains unknown.
It seems to have been while Trautmansdorff and Questenberg were still awaiting Wallenstein's answer at Pilsen that the young King of Hungary's confessor, Father Quiroga - one of the Capuchin diplomatists-proposed to the Commander-in-Chief, by way of testing his intentions, that he should send a division of 6000 horse to Elsass, to accompany the Cardinal Infante on his march to the Netherlands. In Pilsen rumours were rife that Wallenstein intended to resign his command ; indeed he had talked in this vein to Quiroga, though probably only by way of ruse. He had, in any case, made up his mind to yield neither to the unwarranted orders of the Emperor nor to Quiroga's insulting suggestion. Acting strictly within his rights, he sent explicit orders to Suys not to move. Then, on January 11, 1634, he, notwithstanding TrautmansdorfFs protests, called together a Council of War consisting of his principal commanders. About fifty attended, including Piccolomini (Gallas and Aldringer were not at Pilsen) ; and Field-Marshal How laid the Imperial demands before the meeting on Wallenstein's behalf, and stated his intention, as matters stood, to resign. The commanders declared the Imperial demands impracticable, and sent two successive deputations to Wallenstein, entreating him to remain. On January 12 he consented, and on the same day, at a banquet given by How, a resolution (SMuss) of inviolable fidelity to him was signed by the commanders in the midst of a drunken uproar. According to Onate, A clause in the copy of this resolution first shown to the officers, which limited their oath of fidelity by the words " so long as he remains in the Emperor's service " was struck out by Wallenstein with his own hand ;
While thus the Protestant Electors and even the cautious Oxenstierna continued to recognise Wallenstein's importance for a possible settlement, and Richelieu's agent had not ceased to hold out to him the prospect of the Bohemian Crown, his own position was being gradually undermined. We cannot say how and to what extent the fidelity of Gallas, Piccolomini, and Aldringer to their chief had already been tampered with before the final step was taken; but it can hardly have been a surprise to Gallas. Before the end of the year 1683 the Emperor had appointed a secret commission to consult about the measures to be taken against Wallenstein, It consisted of Eggenberg, Trautmansdorff, and the Bishop of Vienna. Onate, who had made up his mind that everything depended upon not allowing Wallenstein to "leap the ditch"-i.e.,settle the problem by his own action-was, with the King of Hungary, admitted to the sittings of the commission, and hinted at the most expeditious way out of the difficulty. The news of the Pilsen resolution, by which Wallenstein had hoped to safeguard his position, finally made it untenable.
On January 24 a patent (perhaps post-dated) was drawn up, which deposed Wallenstein and appointed the King of Hungary commander-in-chief of the Imperial armies, while absolving all superior and inferior officers from their obedience to Wallenstein and assigning independent commands to Gallas and Aldringer. The patent also referred to the dismissal and penal prosecution of two of Wallenstein's chief officers (Trczka and How being those intended); and named Piccolomini and Colloredo as Field-Marshals. This patent was not as yet made public ;
Two days later a second "resolution" was signed by the commanders at Pilsen, who, this time, however, numbered not more than thirty. One of the generals-Diodati-had already taken his departure without orders. This resolution was in response to Wallenstein's promise to relieve them of their commands should he (" which had never entered into his mind "") undertake aught against the Emperor, and to his declaration that he desired to secure himself against the machinations of his adversaries. It promised that the signatories, should he remain with the army, would hold out by him to the last. Wallenstein sent word of this resolution to Vienna, intending himself to march on Prague, there carry through the negotiations with Arnim, and conclude peace with Saxony. He believed himself still strong enough to force the Emperor to do his bidding, but sought to keep open a door of retreat by a series of messages of which one, offering to resign the command if no force were used against him, was actually delivered to Ferdinand by the
Duke's cousin Maximilian von Wallenstein. At the same time he sent Francis Albert of Lauenburg to Bernard of Weimar at Ratisbon, requesting the Swedish general to move a few thousand horse to the Bohemian frontier. But while he was thus seeking to safeguard himself front and rear the ground crumbled away under his feet.
On February 24, 1634, the whole of Wallenstein's army was to have assembled on the White Hill at Prague, there, on conditions which still remained untold, to dictate peace. Before that day arrived-if an insignificant movement in Wallenstein's favour in Silesia be left out of account-the whole of that army had fallen away from him, with the exception of How's and Trczka's regiments. The garrison of Prague, upon which troops had been concentrated even before the issue of the patent, set the example by renouncing its obedience. The commanding officers, returning to their various stations from Pilsen, heard the news ; and the defection set in. At Pilsen Wallenstein announced to the officers around him that he proposed to muster all his forces at Laun, near the Saxon frontier, and bade them meet him in person at Eger, whither he was about to proceed. Fresh messages were sent to Bernard of Weimar, who received these overtures very coolly, both suspecting their authenticity and doubting the fidelity of Wallenstein's troops ; nor did he advance upon Bohemia till all was over.
On February 24 Wallenstein held his entry into Eger, Trczka's and How's regiments pitching their tents round the place. Baffled and abandoned, Wallenstein deceived himself even as to the fidelity of those upon whom his personal security at Eger depended. The chief officers of the fortress, Gordon and Leslie, were two Protestant Scotchmen, whose sense of military honour seems to have revolted against the arguments pressed on them by Trczka and How. Colonel Walter Butler, whom Wallenstein had half accidentally invited to accompany him, was an Irish Catholic of a similarly conscientious frame of mind. At a banquet given by Gordon to the officers, Kinsky, Trczka, and How were massacred. After a last hesitation whether it would suffice to arrest the traitor-in-chief, it was resolved to kill him ; and some of Butler's Irish dragoons, with their captain Devereux in command, accomplished the deed (February 25).
Francis Albert of Lauenburg, returning from his bootless errand to Bernard of Weimar was taken prisoner ; so were Colonel von Schlieff, who had been sent to warn Wallenstein's faithful adherent General von Schaffgotsch in Silesia, with Schaffgotsch himself, and Wallenstein's Chancellor Elz. All the threads of the great politician's intrigues were severed; and the whole of his mighty army had fallen away from the famous commander who had created it. He died as an outlawed traitor.
No personality occupies a place in the history of the Thirty Years' War at once so characteristic of that war and so unique in itself as that of Wallenstein. But his greatness-if such it was-lies not in his
2. NÖRDLINGEN AND PRAGUE. (1634-5.)
After Bernard of Weimar, uncertain whether How's news from Pilsen were true or merely intended to mask some movement of Wallenstein, had quitted Ratisbon to protect his Franconian duchy, the news reached him of the catastrophe at Eger. He then changed his course for Bohemia, proposing to "take advantage for the common weal of the massacre and its consequences " ; but, on meeting with no response from Arnim, whom he had summoned to join him with the Saxon army, he fell back on the Upper Palatinate. Arnim, now that Wallenstein and his projects of peace were no more, would gladly have fallen in with Oxenstiema's policy of including Saxony in the Alliance of Heilbronn and thus once more restoring the complete ascendancy of Sweden ; but John George once more refused to follow his Field-Marshal's advice, and, while the members of the Heilbronn Alliance assembled at Frankfort, engaged in separate negotiations with the Emperor's envoys at Leitmeritz (March, 1634). The efforts of Oxenstierna to expand the Heilbronn Alliance, to strengthen its relations with Sweden, and to correct the defects in its military organisation, were very coldly received by its members. The suggestion of the Saxon ambassadors that negotiations
The Saxons under Arnim about this time defeated the Imperialists at Liegnitz ; and Bernard still hoped for a joint invasion of Bohemia. But he soon learnt that the tables had been turned upon him. By the middle of May, King Ferdinand of Hungary, eager for his first military laurels, with Gallas in command under him, advanced with an army of 25,000 men from Pilsen, while Aldringer stood with nearly 8000 more at Straubing on the Danube, below Batisbon. Their object was the recovery of that city, whose capture had been Bernard's most glorious achievement. He lost no time in coming to the rescue, crossing the river at Kelheim above Ratisbon ; but he ran short of supplies, and was obliged to fall back towards Nürnberg. In the middle of July he at last effected his junction with Horn at Augsburg. It was too late to save Ratisbon, which, on July 22, 1634, capitulated to King Ferdinand. The free city had once more to swear allegiance to the Emperor, but was treated with consideration, while the garrison were allowed to march out with all the honours of war.
The movements of Bernard and Horn, whose only chance of arresting the enemy's progress was now an open battle, were terribly impeded by heavy rains; they were forced to separate once more, and, before they reunited at Gunzburg in Upper Swabia (August), Donauwörth had been taken by Ferdinand. The Imperialists hereupon occupied the Swabian lands to the south, and the Franconian to the north, of the river, Johann von Werth's horse and Isolani's Croatians carrying fire and sword through the country, while the main body of the army moved upon Nördlingen (north-west of Donauwörth). Perceiving the strategic value of Nördlingen as a base whence the enemy could distribute his troops through comfortable quarters in Swabia, Bernard induced the inhabitants to fortify their town, and, promising speedy relief, placed in it a Swedish garrison of between four and five hundred men, under a brave commander, Eric Debitz. On August 23 the Swedish army under Bernard and Horn reached the neighbourhood of the town.
The course of the ensuing operations is in many respects obscure. But it is clear that, had the attack been made at once, as Bernard desired, the besieging army of the Imperialists would have been weaker by some 15,000 troops, which the Cardinal Infante brought up on September 3.
On the other hand it is certain that, had the attack been delayed, as Horn wished, till a day or two after it was actually made, the 6000 troops of the Swabian Circle, which were approaching under the Rhinegrave, Otto Lewis, would have been on the spot. As it was, the Imperialist forces outnumbered by nearly one-third the Swedish, whose total is variously stated, but can hardly have reached 25,000. With the King of Hungary were Gallas, the actual commander of the Imperialist forces, Johann von Werth, the dashing Bavarian leader of horse, and Duke Charles of Lorraine, who was at the head of 6000 troops..
After Horn had contrived to throw a small additional number of men into Nördlingen, the Swedes crossed to the right bank of the river Eger, where the Imperialists had occupied the heights south of the town. Bernard had undertaken to relieve Nördlingen by September 6 ; the concerted signal had appeared on the church tower ; and the brave Debitz, hard pressed by the besiegers, had agreed to capitulate, unless relieved by the promised date. On the afternoon of September 5- (when in accordance with the system of alternating command Bernard led the van)-the Swedish army ascended the wooded ridge of the Arnsberg, and issuing forth from it suddenly directed their attack upon the trenches constructed by the Imperialists immediately before Nördlingen. In Horn's judgment, the combat had begun too soon ; but it was fiercely carried on till deep into the night. On the following morning (September 6, 1634) Horn was in command on the right wing, and, having been overruled on the previous night, gave battle along the whole line of the Imperialists. The attack lasted six hours, but failed ; and Horn was in danger of being cut off from Bernard on the left wing till he came up about noon-too late in Horn's judgment-and covered Horn's retreat. But Bernard's own troops were thrown back in confusion upon Horn's in their rear by a charge of Johann von Werth's cavalry ; and the result was a general flight. In the midst of it both Horn and Bernard were taken prisoners, but the latter escaped. Many superior officers, the whole artillery, the standards and the baggage of the Swedish army were captured ; 6000 men fell. Nördlingen surrendered, moderate terms being granted to the town by King Ferdinand, while the gallant garrison were allowed to depart, though without their arms.
The remnant of the Swedish troops, temporarily reinforced after the event by the Rhinegrave, rallied at Heilbronn ; whence, in the hope of something being done to reorganise the army by the Convention still sitting at Frankfort, they were moved on to the neighbourhood of that city. Meanwhile, as Oxenstierna had foreseen, all Württemberg fell without a blow into the hands of the Imperialists, the young Duke Eberhard taking refuge at Strassburg: and thus one of the chief members of the Heilbronn Alliance came under the heel of the Reaction. Piccolomini and other generals occupied Bernard's Franconian duchy, Würzburg capitulating in October, though the citadel held out three
The first step in the tortuous and unedifying process by which the Alliance was actually brought to an end was taken, a few days before the battle of Nordlingen, by the compact concluded at the Frankfort Convention between the representatives of the Heilbronn Alliance and Feuquieres. After France had, in 1632, acquired the control of the electorate of Trier and had by the capture of Nancy become mistress of Lorraine, the designs of her Government had begun to extend from the line of the Moselle to that of the Ehine. In the winter of 1633-4 French troops occupied a succession of places in Elsass and thus came face to face with the Spaniards under the command (till his death in January, 1634) of Feria; but Richelieu was still anxious to avoid a "rupture" with the House of Austria, and to confine the French sphere of military action to the left bank of the river. On the other hand, in order to prevent the Imperialists in their turn from operations on that bank, it was necessary to secure as outworks on the right bank, at the two ends of the line of defence, the fortresses of Breisach and Philippsburg. The latter of these, situate above Speier, was, like Ehrenbreitstein opposite Coblenz, a creation of the warlike Bishop Philip Christopher, afterwards Archbishop and Elector of Trier. After many vicissitudes Philippsburg had, in January, 1634, fallen into Swedish hands. Its transfer into French hands had been pressed in the early sittings of the Frankfort Convention, and, after the fall of Ratisbon, was granted on terms which saved the credit of the Alliance, Feuquieres promising in return French aid, to consist, if necessary, not only in the 6000 foot demanded, but in the advance to the Rhine of the whole French force of 25,000 men (August 30).
For the immediate necessities of the army of the Alliance the
Convention had done next to nothing ; and, already before the catastrophe of Nördlingen, Oxenstierna's soul had been full of bitterness. No sooner had the news arrived, than the Convention prepared to break up with a general declaration in favour of the maintenance of the Alliance, and the provision of a due satisfaction for the Swedish Crown ; but time was found by some of the members for secret offers to Feuquières. Informed of these, Oxenstierna resolved to outbid them by a direct offer to Louis XIII of Elsass, so far as it was in Swedish hands. With this offer, the Chancellor's agent, the experienced Württemberg official Löffler, was sent to Paris, to find that most of what he was offering to France was already in her grasp (September-October).
Bernard's beaten army could not be reorganised without money, which the Frankfort Convention had been unwilling and which Oxenstierna was unable to provide ; nor could it be once more made an effective force unless by accessions from one or more of the armies which in different parts of the Empire held out for the Protestant cause. Field-Marshal Bauer, who, after the battle of Liegnitz and the death of Duwall, had succeeded to the command of the Swedish division in Silesia, had, after separating from Arnim and threatening Prague, advanced into Thuringia, where he and Duke William of Weimar had enough to do to hold their own against the Imperialists. Landgrave William of Hesse-Cassel's general Melander (Count von Holzapfel) had considerable difficulty in maintaining his position in Westphalia. A handful of troops was furnished by Duke George of Luneburg, the general of the Lower Saxon Circle, which he had nearly cleared of Imperialist troops ; but this wary prince had even before Nördlingen been impatient of Swedish control, and curtly refused to make any further exertion on Bernard's behalf. In these circumstances, Oxenstierna with some acerbity opposed any movement and insisted on Bernard's army, which in September had reached Frankfort, remaining within reach of the expected French support.
Frankfort seeming no longer safe, the army, early in October, moved on to Mainz, whither Oxenstierna and the Council of the Heilbronn Alliance also hurriedly transferred their quarters. But the troops, still left without pay, were soon allowed by Bernard to cross to the left bank of the Rhine, where in the Lower Palatinate and its vicinity they hoped for better quarters-an object which, in the Thirty Years' War, determined many "strategic" movements. Disregarding Oxenstierna's disciplinary ordinance, and enraged at the scant welcome offered them by the population, the troops ravaged the unhappy Palatinate, as Rusdorf complained to Elizabeth, more savagely than had any of its enemies. The administrator, Count Palatine Lewis Philip, with whom Feuquières had placed himself in communication, saw no way of protecting the country but by admitting French garrisons into the fortress of Mannheim and one or two smaller places (October).
About the same time, a more important step forward was taken by France, when the Bhinegrave Otto Lewis, who had detached himself again from Bernard's army in order to secure Kehl opposite Strassburg, and was threatened by a strong Imperialist force moving upon Colmar and Schlettstadt, concluded with the French Marshal de La Force an agreement placing practically the whole of Upper Elsass under French protection. The Bhinegrave died soon afterwards ; but the treaty had been approved both by Louis XIII and by Oxenstierna. Hereupon, while Bernard's army was still left without the promised 6000 French troops, Feuquières was ordered to raise a force of more than twice that number to guard the course of the river from Mainz upwards. Clearly, when the intervention of France actually took place, it would not confine itself to a mere support of the Swedish army.
When, early in November, Johann von Werth, after surprising the town of Heidelberg, began to lay siege to its castle, of which Bernard declined to attempt the relief as beyond his strength, the aid of the French Marshals de La Force and de Brézé from Landau and Speier was invited. But, after they had actually started for the deliverance of the Palatinate, they were detained by Feuquières, who was anxious to avoid precipitating a rupture; and a joint demonstration across the Bhine on the part of the French and Bernard induced the Bavarian general to let go the prize so persistently coveted by his master.
Thus, while Bernard's army, now again amounting to about 18,000 troops, was in its position between Main and Bhine threatened by the advance from Franconia and Swabia of his old victorious Nördlingen adversaries, Gallas and Charles of Lorraine, with a superior force of 14,000 horse and 16,000 foot, France remained in possession of Upper Elsass. In any bargain to be struck by Oxenstierna's agent with Bichelieu in Paris, the French Minister could accordingly impose his own terms. This explains the treaty signed by Löffler at Paris on November 1, whereby France entered into an alliance with Sweden and her Heilbronn confederates for securing a good and enduring peace in the Empire, on condition that the Catholic religion should be restored in all lands conquered by the Swedes or their allies, and that the neutrality of any Prince or city that should accept the protection of France should be assured. She would maintain an army of her own on the left bank of the Bhine and pay 1,000,000 livres as an annual subsidy to the combatants on the right. If she declared war against the House of Austria, she would, so long as the war lasted, maintain 12,000 troops, natives of Germany or any other country but France, under the command of one of the Princes of the Heilbronn Alliance, but with a French Marshal in his Council of War, entitled, in the case of a combination of armies, to a share in the supreme command. In this event the subsidy of a million would be stopped. But France entered into no obligation to declare war ; and it was left to her discretion, whether she
Meanwhile Oxenstierna had summoned the Heilbronn Allies to meet at Worms (November 30). He was so incensed by the Paris Treaty that he dismissed Löffler from the Swedish service, and turned his back upon the German members of the Alliance, who, though uneasy about the clause as to the Catholic religion, were willing to proceed. Nearly the whole of December passed in discussion and altercation ; but Oxenstierna could not be persuaded to ratify the treaty until he should be convinced that France actually intended the rupture. At the same time the breach was widening between him and Bernard, who openly sought to obtain from the Worms Convention a definite commission as general of the forces of the Alliance, which would have transferred to him its direction, hitherto in the hands of the Swedish Chancellor. The French Government had for some time been seeking to attach Bernard more closely to itself; but neither Richelieu nor Feuquières had as yet resolved upon accepting him as commander of a combined army ; indeed Feuquières would have preferred William of Hesse-Cassel, who was already in receipt of a French pension.
After Johann von Werth's enforced departure, the castle of Heidelberg was once more besieged, this time by an Imperialist force of 6000 troops; and, while Bernard was slowly coming to a conclusion with Feuquières as to the terms on which he would relieve the place, the whole French army, nearly 30,000 strong, crossed the Rhine at Mannheim, and a division of it numbering 12,000 relieved Heidelberg Castle, allowing the besiegers to depart. Bernard with his army arrived a day too late; but the French success, incomplete as it was, seemed at last to have made a rupture with the Emperor inevitable. Those of the Princes who remained at Worms-for the Imperial Towns characteristically held back-ratified the Paris Treaty. But Oxenstierna persistently refused to sign the new compact, maintaining that it put an end to the old Suedo-French subsidy treaty, concluded at Bärwalde and renewed at Heilbronn.
As for the Heilbronn Alliance proper, it seemed to have been superseded by the Paris Treaty and by the actual interference of France in arms, which must assuredly be soon followed by a declaration of war on her part against the Emperor. The Worms Convention, which had adjourned to January, was not actually reopened by Oxenstierna till February 17, 1635, under the depressing influence of the extensive Spanish preparations for the coming campaign and of the progress of the Saxon endeavours (to be described immediately) for a separate peace with the Emperor. He could only exhort his allies in their turn to sign no separate treaties with France, and to be careful in any common negotiations to accept no proposition from the Emperor that was not confirmed by Spain. Bernard's reiterated arguments in favour of an unfettered chief military command he could only meet by a compromise
This was so clearly perceived by Oxenstierna that, so early as December, 1634, he sent to Paris a resident of special ability and distinction, who had been highly valued by King Gustavus Adolphus. After his vicissitudes in his native country, Hugo Grotius had found a refuge in France, and had there written the great work On the Law of War and Peace which was to immortalise his name. Unfortunately for the course of the present negotiations, he was not a persona grata with Richelieu. But the Cardinal knew that a solution must be found for the difficulties which had arisen in the relations between France and Sweden. He was intent on war with Spain, and there must be no gap in the great coalition which he contemplated against her and her ally the Emperor. The reconciliation between the King and Orleans had secured the French monarchy at home; but its defence against the combined efforts of the two Habsburg dynasties on the Rhine could no longer be left to the Suedo-German arms without open and continuous French support. In the early part of 1635 two important successes were gained by the Imperialists. Philippsburg, the recent acquisition of France, was captured with all the supplies of money and material accumulated there (January 24); and Johann von Werth took Speier (February 2). Shortly afterwards Duke Charles of Lorraine crossed the Rhine to lay siege to Colmar. The French forces consequently, so soon as the weather permitted, withdrew to the left bank (February 22) ; and before long Bernard, upon whose position near Darmstadt Gallas and Count Philip von Mansfeld were closing in, likewise crossed the river, and induced the French Marshals to aid him in bringing about the capitulation of Speier ("March 21). Clearly, unless the Spaniards from Luxemburg were to join hands with the Imperialists from the Upper and Middle Rhine, France, besides concluding an offensive and defensive alliance with the States General (February) must see to carrying out the treaty of November, 1634, and overcome Oxenstierna''s repugnance to that agreement.
Thus in the new negotiations Father Joseph and his fellow diplomatists exerted all their ingenuity to combat the objections of Grotius to the acceptance of the Paris Treaty; till in the end the Swedish Chancellor journeyed in person to Compiègne, which he reached on April 20. He had the satisfaction of finding that the progress of the Spaniards, who had just by a raid from Luxemburg taken Trier
(March 26) and carried off the Elector Philip Christopher, the protégé of France, had materially altered the tone of the French Court and of the great Minister. The Act of Alliance rapidly concluded at Compiègne . on April 28 renewed the obligations of the two Powers not to make peace with the House of Austria, " with which they were at present at war," unless by mutual consent, while each Power was to support the German Protestants according to its individual obligations. It assured to Sweden the restoration of her conquests on the Rhine, in case they should be recovered by French arms; and it conceded to France the principle that the Catholic religion should be exercised wherever it had been before 1618. But, while the Treaty of Compiègne amounted generally to a renewal of the obligations of the compacts of Bärwalde and Heilbronn, its advantages remained with Oxenstierna. The obnoxious Paris Treaty was now a dead letter, and the future relations between France and Sweden were left open to further arrangement. Further, Oxenstierna safeguarded himself by the stipulation that the treaty was to require ratification by his Queen ; which it was of course in his power to reserve till France should have broken with the House of Austria. Thus in this struggle between the two great statesmen the hand of France had been more distinctly forced than that of Sweden.
The settlement with Sweden completed Richelieu's dispositions for the war which France actually declared against Spain on May 19,1635. Preparations on a great scale had long been in progress, and were substantially complete in April. While two armies were to take the offensive in the Low Countries and in Italy, and a third was to occupy the passes of the Valtelline, a fourth, under Marshal de La Force, was to cooperate with Bernard of Weimar in covering the Palatinate, Elsass, and Lorraine. About Langres was placed a reserve force, commanded first by the Marquis de Sourdis, and afterwards by Cardinal La Valette. Much remained unsettled in the relations between France and the allies with whom she was united by the mutual tie of necessity, more especially as to the position of their leading general, Bernard of Weimar ; and she was still free to choose her own time for declaring her rupture with the Emperor. But in the spring of 1635 she definitely entered into the great German War.
Not without reason had Oxenstierna admonished the Heilbronn Alliance at Worms against the seductions of separate pacifications. While the interests of Sweden and of her German associates had begun to diverge, and the Heilbronn Alliance under the guidance of the half-discredited Löffler was on the brink of final dissolution, the Elector John George had brought to a successful issue his long-cherished plan of a separate peace with the Emperor. Though the settlement achieved by him was far more restricted in its scope than that which had been in the mind of Wallenstein, it was readily accepted by nearly the whole of Protestant Germany.
It has been seen how in March, 1634, the Saxon Government had entered into peace negotiations with the Emperor at Leitmeritz. Oxen-stierna, who detested these negotiations, had sought to interrupt them by ordering Banér to invade Bohemia, and John George had actually joined with the Swedes in a futile march upon Prague. Leitmeritz being in Swedish hands, the negotiations were at the end of July transferred to Pirna near Dresden, and here they continued after the battle of Nördlingen. From the first they addressed themselves to two sets of questions-the one turning, without any actual mention of the Edict of Restitution, on the religious settlement in the Empire at large ; the other affecting specifically Saxon interests, the possession of Lusatia and the see of Magdeburg. At Pirna Arnim still took part in the transactions, but they were in the main conducted by the official commissioners on both sides, the Emperor's chief representative being Traut-mansdorff ; for Eggenberg, his most trusted councillor, died in October, 1634. Landgrave George of Hesse-Darmstadt, John George's son-in-law, was, according to his wont, largely instrumental in bringing the negotiations to a successful conclusion. On November 24 an armistice was formally agreed upon between the Imperialist and Saxon forces at Laun, which lasted till the actual conclusion of peace.
After the settlement of the conditions of peace at Pirna, proceedings had been adjourned to the middle of January; but it was not till Aprils, 1635. that they were actually resumed at Prague. In the meantime the Emperor had asked the approval of the Catholic Electors, but had met with difficulties on the part of Maximilian of Bavaria, who was desirous of further advantages for himself, and of his brother of Cologne, who had religious scruples ; the Elector of Mainz soon waived his objections. He had further consulted twenty Viennese theologians, among whom four Jesuits gave their opinion, in which Father Lamormain concurred, against the peace and the implied suspension of the Edict of Restitution. Finally, a Committee of Imperial Councillors had approved of the adoption, with certain modifications, of the proposed settlement.
The final discussions were not brought to a conclusion till May 30, when the Peace was actually signed, the ratification following on June 15. The Peace of Prague purported, in so far as its conditions were not of a specific nature, to include any Estate of the Empire by whom it was accepted. The following are the most important of the terms of the treaty itself, and of the supplementary pronouncements (Nebcnrecesse) by which it was accompanied.
As to the fundamental question of the ownership of ecclesiastical lands, it was settled that any such lands held on November 12, 1627 (the date of the Mühlhausen meeting noted above), whether acquired before or after the Religious Peace of Augsburg, should continue so to be held for forty years, or restored for such a period if they had been taken away. Within that period an amicable arrangement was to be
The main demand of Saxony-the cession of Lusatia in compensation for the aid afforded to the Emperor during the Bohemian troubles-was granted under certain conditions of reversion which long remained without practical significance. The see of Magdeburg (whose territory was still in Swedish hands) was to be held by its Protestant Archbishop, the Saxon Prince Augustus, certain districts being detached from it as hereditary possessions of the Saxon Elector. The former Administrator, Christian William of Brandenburg, was assigned an annual pension of 12,000 dollars. The rights of the Emperor's son Leopold William as Bishop of Halberstadt were confirmed.
The Emperor had declined to tolerate the exercise of their religion by the adherents of the Augsburg Confession in his own dominions, except in parts of Silesia. In his other lands he reserved for himself the right of regulating their religious condition.
Any territories taken from the Emperor or his allies (among whom the Duke of Lorraine was included) since the Swedish landing were to be restored to him. The same provision was to apply to adherents of the Augsburg Confession, among whom special mention was made of the Dukes of Mecklenburg. Saxony, and implicitly all other Estates who adhered to the Peace, bound themselves to assist the Emperor in arms to recover such conquered territories. Thus the Peace constituted a direct challenge to Sweden, and also to France.
As to the Palatinate, Saxony, after at first making, sincerely or otherwise, some efforts on behalf of the expelled dynasty, accepted the Imperial view that both the Electoral dignity and the lands were forfeited by Frederick Vs descendants; the Emperor however undertook, should they conduct themselves loyally, to provide for them as princes. For the present they were excluded from the general amnesty announced in the Peace, and with them those who had incurred punishment by taking part in the Bohemian and Upper Austrian insurrections at the outset of the war. Landgrave George had not succeeded in bringing about the exclusion of his kinsman of Hesse-Cassel, whose military force
All leagues, alliances, and associations in arms were dissolved. The army that was henceforth to withstand the common enemy was to be the army of the Emperor and the Empire, and to be placed under an Imperial commander-in-chief. A division estimated at a quarter of the entire force (or 20,000 men) was, however, to be under the special command of the Elector of Saxony.
Such were the provisions of a Peace which, with all its shortcomings and blemishes, corresponded on the whole, not only to the interests of the contracting parties, but to those of a large majority of the Protestant Princes and Free Cities of the Empire and to the yearnings of all its suffering populations. Inasmuch as this agreement was of a nature to call forth the determined opposition of both Sweden and France, whose expulsion from the Empire it was intended to bring about, the efforts of these Powers were naturally exerted to prevent its acceptance by the more important Princes of the Empire. French diplomacy, though very active at Dresden, was too late in seeking to divert John George, by the illusive prospect of an elective Bohemian Crown, from a policy to which in his heart he had always been inclined. Maximilian of Bavaria, whom the terms of the compact could not altogether suit, and to whose authority as head of the Catholic League it put an end, refused to accept the Peace until he had been placed in the same position as the Elector of Saxony by being assured the command of a quarter of the Imperial army. Oxenstierna attempted to prevent the adhesion of George William of Brandenburg by holding out the bait of Silesia, and by the more practical suggestion of a curtailment of the Swedish claim on Pomerania. But the feeling of the Brandenburg Estates was unanimously in favour of following the Saxon lead; and, being a Calvinist himself, George William may have felt well advised in securing the benefits of the treaty. For there were ominous doubts, which orthodox Lutherans showed no disposition to conceal, whether the Peace covered the Calvinists. In the end George William accepted the treaty, though, as will be seen, not unconditionally. Thus by the end of August, 1635, nearly all the more important Princes and larger Free Towns had accepted the Peace of Prague. Among them were, besides the Elector of Brandenburg, the Dukes of Holstein-Gottorp, Pomerania, Württemberg, and Brunswick, together with several of the Ernestine Dukes. The Landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt might himself be called one of the authors of the Peace; it was also accepted by Margrave William of Baden-Baden, by the Princes of Anhalt, including Christian, as well as by the Free Cities of Hamburg,
Lübeck, Frankfort-on-the-Main, Ulm, and-remarkably enough-by Strassburg and other Rhenish cities. The Archbishop of Bremen, Prince Frederick of Denmark, was not restrained from following their example by gratitude to Sweden for leaving him in the enjoyment of his see. Thus no reigning Princes remained outside the pale, except the still unpardoned Landgrave William of Cassel, and Duke William of Weimar. But these were prepared to accept the Peace if it were made more acceptable to France and Sweden. So was Duke George of Lüne-burg, who, instead of following the example of Bernard of Weimar, and placing his sword at the service of France, skilfully contrived to maintain for some time a profitable neutrality. .
If John George could have followed up the Peace of Prague by a settlement with Sweden, he would have issued forth from the conflict as master of the political situation ; for during the Prague negotiations he had maintained an understanding with Spain, and France could not have intervened alone against the combination which would have confronted her. But in this additional attempt the Saxon policy of peace which had achieved so notable a first success, broke down. Oxenstierna, who had failed in detaching Brandenburg from Saxony, was not to be brought to a distinct renunciation of Sweden's Pomeranian claim. At a conference held at Magdeburg, early in August, 1635, between the Chancellor, Marshal Banér, who commanded the Swedish force in this quarter, and Saxon ambassadors, Oxenstierna's refusal was found to have the warm support of the Swedish army. Attracted by a suggestion from John George that Sweden should temporarily hold Stralsund in pledge, Oxenstierna sought to reopen negotiations on the basis of the immediate transfer of the see of Magdeburg into Saxon hands. But, prompted by the Brandenburg Elector, who made the refusal of any part of Pomerania to Sweden the siiie qua non of his acceptance of the Peace of Prague, John George refused to budge. Hereupon Oxenstierna, fearing that Sweden and her army might be left in the lurch, offered a moderate ultimatum, demanding for Sweden only a money compensation and the payment in full of the demands of her army, together with the tenure of some towns in pledge. The dispute had all but narrowed itself to the question as to what should be the amount of the money payment, and whether it should cover the claims of the Swedish as well as the German officers of the Swedish army, when John George, by the Emperor's advice, broke off the negotiation, and in the middle of October, 1635, ordered his troops to recommence hostilities against Banér.
Thus, in this eventful year, after the war had under new conditions reopened on the Rhine, it once more broke out on the Elbe; and the advent of peace, for which the whole nation longed, and on whose conditions Emperor and Empire had agreed among themselves, seemed as distant as ever.